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INTERPLEADER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
WERNER ILSEN WILLIAM SARDELL

A

LTHOUGH much has been written on interpleader in the
federal courts, a limited re-examination of this subject
as it has developed over the years may be of interest.

THE BASIC BACKGROUND
In the words of Zechariah Chafee:
Where two persons are engaged in a dispute, and that which is to
be the fruit of the dispute is in the hands of a third party who occupies the position of a stakeholder and is willing to give up the stakes
according to the result of the dispute, then if that stakeholder is sued
or threatened with suit, he is not obliged to be at the expense and
risk of defending two actions; but, on giving up the thing in dispute,
he is to be relieved, and the court directs that the persons between
whom the dispute really exists shall fight it out at their own expense.'
t Member of the New York and Federal Bars and Professor of Law,
St. John's University School of Law.
* Member of the New York and Federal Bars.
1 Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALE L.J. 814 (1921).

This is
one of a series of articles on interpleader by Professor Chafee, articles which

have served as fons et origo for much of the subsequent writing on the sub-

Other articles in the series by Chafee are: Interstate Interpleader, 33
L.J. 685 (1924); Interpleader it; the United States Courts, 41 YALE
L.J. 1134, 42 YAiE L.J. 41 (1932); The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936
(Parts I & 11), 45 YALE L.J. 963, 1161 (1936); Federal Interpleader Since
the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377 (1940) ; Broadening the Second Stage of
Interpleader (Series I & II), 56 HARv. L. REV. 541. 929 (1943).
ject.

YALE

2
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Historically, the origins of interpleader have been traced
back to the fourteenth century year books, and surprisingly,
to the common law and not to equity.2 Thus, a report of
the Court of Common Pleas dated 1313 relates a case involving the "writ of wardship" of an infant wherein the defendant, who produced the infant, stated that another claimant
had also brought wardship. The court ordered both claimants of the guardianship to plead between themselves.' As
a matter of fact, this case goes perhaps further than do some
so-called modern equity cases since relief was granted in the
absence of privity between the parties.4
Subsequently, we find the extension of this concept to
bailees of deeds deposited with them to secure or to await
the performance of a condition. Upon the happening or nonhappening of the condition, detinue might be brought against
the bailee, either by one or by both bailors. In the first situation, when only one claimant was before the court, the interpleader was by way of garnishment, since the second claimant, not then in court, had to be "garnished" I into court by
writ of scire facias; in the second case, when both adverse
claimants were already in court, there was compulsory
interpleader.6
Thus "interpleader" in detinue cases-which because of procedural reasons might take one of two forms as outlined abovewas an extremely just and liberal method by which a defendant
might prevent a possible double liability with respect to one duty.
The only requirements were that the claimants seek the same thing;
that the defendant be under no independent liability by reason of
his own wrongdoing; and, that the defendant stand indifferently
7
between the adverse parties.
The growth of equitable interpleader was concurrent
with that of the common law, though it was not until 1484
2

Rogers, Historical Origins of Iwterpleader, 51

3Newmarket v. Boville, Y.B. Mich. 7 Edw.

YALE

L.J. 924 (1942).

II, 162, pl. 15 (1313), in

36 S.LDEi SociETY (1918) ; Rogers, supra note 2, at 926 n.14.
4 Rogers, supra note 2, at 928. See Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader,
30 YALE L.J. 814, 828, 840 (1921).
5 From the French "garnir," to warn.
6 Rogers, supra note 2, at 933-47.
7Id. at 947.
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that we have what appears to be the first bill of interpleader
in equity.8 Later the so-called detinue interpleader fell into

disuse and interpleader in equity took the ascendancy.
Finally equity prevailed and took over exclusive jurisdiction
in this field and in other fields.9
STRICT INTERPLEADER ANI) BILL IN
OF A

BILL

THE NATURE

OF INTERPLEADER

Equity interpleader developed in two modes which are
commonly known as "strict interpleader" and the "bill in
the nature of a bill of interpleader." In strict interpleader
it was essential that:
1. The same thing, debt or duty must be claimed by both or all the
parties against whom relief is demanded; 2. All their adverse titles
or claims must be dependent, or be derived from a common source;
3. The person asking the relief-the plaintiff-must not have nor
claim any interest in the subject-matter; 4. He must have incurred
no independent liability to either of the claimants; that is, he must
stand perfectly indifferent between them, in the position merely of a
stakeholder. 10

As often occurs, limitations which were the results of historical incidents 11 became hardened into principles. And
so, in 1921, Chafee could say: "Interpleader still suffers
from its infantile repressions." 12 Indeed a mere statement
of what the consequences may be if the four requirements
are strictly adhered to will show how hampering they are to
8

Flyyke v. Banyard, 1 Cal. Ch. cxv (1484); Rogers, supra note 2, at
950 n.110.
9 Rogers, supra note 2, at 950.
10 4 PoMERoy, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1322 (5th ed. 1941). "It is sometimes supposed that the remedy of interpleader is allowed to avoid the risk
of two recoveries. This is entirely a mistaken view. If a party has in any
way made himself liable, even for the same demand, to two claimants, he is
not entitled to an interpleader. It is the essential fact that he should actually
be liable to only one of the claimants. The true rationale of interpleader is
that the party thereby avoids the risk of being vexed by two or more suits."
Id. at § 1320. See also Platte Valley State Bank v. National Live-Stock Bank,
155 Ill. 250, 257, 40 N.E. 621, 623 (1895).
11 Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader,30 YAix L.J. 814, 822 (1921).
Comment, The Remedy of Interpleader in California, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 35, 36

(1940).

12 Chafee, suepra note 11, at 823.
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an otherwise expedient remedy. Thus there are cases holding that interpleader would not lie if the claims varied in
amount no matter how trifling, 3 or if the relief demanded
differed in some respect. 14 The requirement of privity,
soundly criticized,' has prevented a vendee from interpleading his vendor and an adverse claimant.' 6 "[Ain agent
cannot interplead his principal and a third person where
the third person asserts paramount title, nor can a tenant
compel his landlord and a stranger to interplead." "T Chafee
pretty well demolished this doctrine over thirty years ago,
both on the basis of logic and on a convincing showing that
the technical doctrine of privity got into equity by accident.'
But courts, either due to precedent or statute, continued to
adhere to it in the case of strict interpleader.
The third requirement of strict interpleader, that of the
plaintiff's disinterest, 19 aside from a desire to avoid multiple
13Id. at 824. Pfister v. Wade, 69 Cal. 133, 10 Pac. 369 (1886).
See also
Hancock Oil Co. v. Independent Distrib. Co., 24 Cal.Zd 497, 150 P.2d 463
(1944); Burton v. Black, 32 Ga. 53 (1861).
14 More v. Western Grain Co., 31 N.D. 369, 153 N.W. 976 (1915) ; Chafee,
supra note 11, at 827-28.
125See Chafee, szpra note 11, at 828-40.
16 North Pac. Lumber Co. v. Lang, 28 Ore. 246, 42 Pac. 799 (1895);
Pardee & Curtin Lumber Co. v. Odell, 78 W. Va. 159, 88 S.E. 419 (1916).
17 Comment, 29 CALni.
L. Ray. 35, 37 (1940).
1s In Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, .rnpra note 11, at 830, he says:
"Mutual exclusiveness requires no connection between the claims except that
the validity of one shall necessitate the invalidity of the other. . . . The
accidental linking of privity with interpleader in some of the very few situations where this remedy lay at common law was assumed to indicate a basic
principle which had to be rigidly maintained, just as a child who has jam on
his bread once always insists on bread and jam."
1983 L. Ed. 840 (1939) compiles many of the cases on strict interpleader.
Some older federal cases are: Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U.S. 568 (1884).
"The bill is either a bill of interpleader or a bill in the nature of a bill of
interpleader [for a discussion of this latter bill, see infra]. It is clear that
it cannot be sustained as a bill of interpleader. In such a bill it is necessary
to aver that the complainant has no interest in the subject-matter of the suit;
he must admit title in the claimants and aver that he is indifferent between
them, and he cannot seek relief in the premises against either of them."
Id. at 571; Groves v. Sentell, 153 U.S. 465 (1894).
"The general rule is
that a party who has an interest in the subject-matter of the suit cannot file
a bill of interpleader, strictly so called. In fact, the assertion of perfect
disinterestedness is an essential ingredient of such a bill." Id. at 485. See
also Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934); Standley v.
Roberts, 59 Fed. 36 (8th Cir. 1894), appeal disimissed, 41 L. Ed. 1177,
17 Sup. Ct 999 (1896). "[A] lessee who has voluntarily taken an independent
lease from each of two adverse claimants to the title of the same real estate,
by establishing these facts, and bringing the amount due on one of the leases
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liability or vexation, is, as pointed out by Chafee, 0 sound if
the claimant has a real interest of as much importance in the
controversy as the obligation out of which the double vexation
arises. Where, however, the obligor disputes but a small
part of one or both, claims, he should be allowed to put the
full amount in dispute in the court registry and retire. Nor
should it be an objection that under interpleader there is no
way to adjudicate his small interest in the suit. What Chafee
calls the "second stage" of interpleader can easily be extended
to a third stage, or the second stage made polygonal. But as
the Supreme Court said in Texas v. Florida,21 in 1939: "The
peculiarity of the strict bill of interpleader was that the
plaintiff asserted no interest in the debt or fund, the amount
of which he placed at the disposal of the court and asked that
the rival claimants be required to settle in the equity suit the
ownership of the claim among themselves." 22
The fourth requirement of strict interpleader, namely,
that plaintiff have "no independent liability to either of the
claimants" is in a way a variation of the third. "[S]ince
the plaintiff is independently liable to one of the claimants,
interpleader would not settle the controversy and plaintiff is
not a disinterested stakeholder." 23 As was shown over thirty
years ago this requirement should not be an insuperable
obstacle; and the fact that there is a possible independent
claim should not deny relief to an applicant who is doubly
vexed by the common claim.2 4 But this question has not been
25
fully solved.

into court, [cannot] compel his lessors to interplead, and litigate their conflicting titles and the validity of their leases, before either of them can receive his rent, and thereby exonerate himself from liability for rent on both
the leases." Id. at 840. See Dee v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 86 F2d 813
(7th Cir. 1936) (decided under the Interpleader Act of May 8, 1926, 46 Stat.
416); United States v. Starrett Bros. & Eker Inc., 18 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.

Pa. 1937).

20Chafee, Modernzing Interpleader, 30
Comment, 29 CALIF. L. Rav. 35, 37 (1940).

YAiE

L.J. 815, 840-41 (1921);

21306 U.S. 398 (1939).

Id. at 406.
Comment, 29 CALIF. L. Rnv. 35, 38 (1940).
Life Ins. Co., supra note 19.
24 Chafee, supra note 20, at 843.
25 See text accompanying notes 139-41 infra.
22

23

See Dee v. Kansas City
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Obviously, the necessity for conformity to the four requirements of strict interpleader seriously impeded its efficient use. To soften the impact of this rigid doctrine, equity
developed the bill in the nature of a bill of interpleader,
when it found equitable jurisdiction to exist aside from
multiple liability
or vexation. In Hayward &. Clark r.
McDonald,2 6 the bill alleged that plaintiffs were the agents
of a defendant's decedent to buy certain commodities, and
receive deposits of money from him for that purpose according to an account embracing more than one hundred debit
items and a larger number of credit items; and that a codefendant claimed a balance due him under transactions
with the decedent relating to a fund held by plaintiffs and
that actions at law had been commenced severally by the
two defendants on account of such fund. The plaintiffs
prayed that they be permitted to deposit the fund in court,
that the law actions be enjoined, and also prayed for general
relief. The defendants demurred for lack of equity. Although
the bill did not contain a special prayer for an accounting
the court overruled the demurrer, saying:
When it is considered that a relation of trust exists between the complainants and McDonald's estate as to the fund held by them, and
as to any sum which may be found due arising from such fiduciary
relation, and that an accounting will be required to ascertain the
amount, and that there are rival claimants for the fund, and that
separate suits have been brought against the complainants for a sum
largely in excess of what they admit is due from them, it seems to
27
us clear that the bill is not without equity.

26192 Fed. 890 (5th Cir. 1912).
27 Id. at 894.
The court also held: "A complainant is not to be deprived
of equitable relief, if entitled to it on other equitable grounds, because his
case has some, but not all, of the attributes of interpleader in equity. For
example, and to refer to a class of cases analogous to the one at bar, a complainant may have in his hands property or money to which others have conflicting claims, in reference to which property or conflicting claims the complainant may have equitable rights or claims and be entitled to equitable relief.
In such case, while he cannot maintain a bill of interpleader strictly so called,
he is nevertheless entitled to relief, and is permitted to maintain a bill in the
nature of a bill of interpleader." Id. at 893. See also Sherman Nat'l Bank
v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 238 Fed. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), aff'd, 247 Fed. 256
(2d Cir. 1917).
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Equity also assumed jurisdiction of a suit involving
conflicting claims on a policy of insurance for the face
amount of $10,000 where the insurance company had deposited in the registry of the court the sum of $10,000 less
,333.50 retained for unpaid premiums. The fact of this
premium retention was held not sufficient to bar a bill in
28
the nature of interpleader.
A bill in equity alleged that X City was threatening to
forfeit the franchise of a street railroad company for matters which had been in dispute between them for years, that
plaintiff was the mortgagee of the railroad company's property which was affected by the city's threat of forfeiture, and
prayed that the city and the railroad company be required to
submit their controversy to the court for determination. The
court held that this case was "a proper one for relief in the
nature of interpleader." 29
Another situation where the bill in the nature of a bill
of interpleader was found applicable is presented in Texas v.
Flcrida.30 Edward H. R. Green, son of the remarkable Hetty
Green, had purportedly maintained his domicile in the state
of Texas. But his many peregrinations had placed him, at
various times and for various purposes, in New York, Massachusetts and Florida. Upon his death, each of these four
states, claiming to be his domicile, asserted the concomitant
right to tax his estate. If the courts of each state, as they
conceivably could, 31 maintained their several rights, the pos28

McNamara v. Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc'y, 114 Fed. 910 (5th Cir.
1902), where the court said: "In this case, neither by the bill nor by any
legitimate inference to be drawn from the evidence, does it appear that thecomplainant had any substantive or substantial interest in the subject-matter
of the suit. Where no such interest is shown, and the complainant's acts
in the premises have been free and above board, and conducive to equity,
a solicitor's fee may be allowed." Id. at 914. Cf. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co. v. Yaw, 53 F.2d 684 (W.D.N.Y. 1931).
29Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. City of Kalamazoo, 182 Fed. 865 (W.D.
Mich. 1910), where the court also observed: "A bill of interpleader, strictly
so called, will not lie where complainant claims any interest in the subjectmatter . . . but equitable relief, analogous to interpleader, will often be
granted in aid of complainant's interest, when there are other interconflicting
interests. . . ." Id. at 872. See also John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Kruger, 22 F. Supp. 326 (D. Md. 1938).
30 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
31 See In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 At!. 303 (1932) ; In re
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sibility existed that all four states (plus the federal government) would tax in a total amount exceeding the total estate.
Accordingly, Texas brought an original suit against the other
three states in the Supreme Court of the United States under
article III of the Constitution. 32 Although the parties did
not question its jurisdiction, the Supreme Court did, sua
sponte. After determining that the case did not fall within
the narrow limits of strict interpleader, the Court held:
But as the sole ground for equitable relief is the danger of injury
because of the risk of multiple suits where the liability is single,
...

and as plaintiffs who are not mere stakeholders may be exposed

to that risk, equity extended its jurisdiction to such cases by the
bill in the nature of interpleader. The essential of the bill in the
nature of interpleader is that it calls upon the court to exercise its
jurisdiction to guard against the risks of loss from the prosecution
in independent suits of rival claims where the plaintiff himself claims
an interest in the property or fund which is subjected to the risk.
The object and ground of the jurisdiction are to guard against the
consequent depletion of the fund at the expense of the plaintiff's interest in it and to protect him and the other parties to the suit from
the jeopardy resulting from the prosecution of numerous demands,
to only one of which the fund is subject. While in point of law or
fact only one party is entitled to succeed, there is danger that recovery may be allowed in more than one suit. Equity avoids the
danger by requiring the rival claimants to litigate before it the decisive issue, and will not withhold its aid where the plaintiff's interest is either not denied or he does not assert any claim adverse to
that of the other parties, other than the single claim, determination
of which is decisive of the rights of all....
When, by appropriate procedure, a court possessing equity
powers is in such circumstances asked to prevent the loss which
might otherwise result from the independent prosecution of rival but
mutually exclusive claims, a justiciable issue is presented for adjudi-

Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 Atl. 601, spplemnental opinion, 116
N.J. Eq. 204, 172 AtI. 503 (Prerog. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 116 N.J.L. 362, 184 At.
743 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936); New Jersey
v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 580 (1932). See also Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393

(1935).

32 See also 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1958) : "(a) The Supreme Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction of: (1) All controversies Letween two
or more States .... "
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cation which, because it is a recognized subject of the equity procedure which we have inherited from England, is a "case" or "controversy," within the meaning of the Constitutional provision; and
when the case is one prosecuted between states, which are the rival
claimants, and the risk of loss is shown to be real and substantial,
the case is within the original jurisdiction of this Court, conferred by
the Judiciary Article. 33
THE FEDERAL INTERPLEADER ACTS

Cutting across the distinction between the bill of strict
interpleader and the bill in the nature of interpleader under

the general equity jurisdiction of the federal courts, 34 is a
separate and distinct type, that of statutory interpleader,
which had its inception in the Federal Interpleader Act of
1917. 35 The necessity for such an act was pointed up in 1916
by the Supreme Court in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy 6
There, Effie Dunlevy, daughter of Joseph Gould, claimed to
be entitled by assignment to the surrender value of an insur-

ance policy on Gould's life issued by :New York Life.
33Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 406-08 (1939).

In

Parenthetically, it may

be noted that in spite of Green's expressed intent and purpose to make Texas
his domicile for tax purposes, the Court found his domicile to be in Massachusetts. See 39 CoLum. L. Rsv. 1017 (1939); 52 HARV. L. Ray. 1178 (1939).
See Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1 (1939), where the Court said:
"By the allegations, the property held in Missouri is amply sufficient to answer the claims of both States and recovery by either does not impair the
exercise of any right the other may have. It is not shown that there is
danger of the depletion of a fund or estate at the expense of the complainants
interest. It is not shown that the tax claims of the two States are mutually
exclusive. On the contrary, the validity of each claim is wholly independent
of that of the other and, in the light of our recent decisions, may constitutionally be pressed by each State without conflict in point of fact or law with
the decision of the other. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357; Graves v.
Elliott, 307 U.S. 383. The question is thus a different one from that presented in Texas v. Florida, where the controlling consideration was that by
the law of the several States concerned only a single tax could be laid by a
single State, that of the domicile. This was sufficient basis for invoking the
equity jurisdiction of the Court, where it also appeared that there was danger
that through successful prosecution of the claims of the several States in
independent suits enough of the estate would be absorbed to deprive some
State of its lawful tax." Id. at 15-16.
34 See text accompanying notes 10-33 supra.
35 Act of Feb. 22, 1917, 39 Stat. 929.
36241 U.S. 518 (1916), noted in 30 H, v. L. REv. 86 (1916). This case
is also discussed in Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936: I, 45 YALE

LJ. 963, 964-65 (1936).
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1907 a creditor of Effie recovered against her a valid personal
judgment by default, after domiciliary service, in the Common Pleas Court, at Pittsburgh, Pa., where she then resided.
During 1909 New York Life became liable under the policy
for some $2500 and this sum was claimed both by Gould, a
citizen of Pennsylvania, and his daughter, who had removed
to, and become a citizen of, California. Thereafter her judgment creditor caused issue of an execution attachment on
this judgment and both the insurance company and Gould
were summoned as garnishees. Effie then brought this suit
in a California state court against New York Life and Gould
to recover the $2500 due on the policy. Both defendants
were duly served with process in that state. After the commencement of the California suit, the insurance company
answered in the Pittsburgh garnishee proceeding, admitted
its indebtedness, set up the conflicting claims to the fund and
prayed for instructions. At the same time at its request, a
rule issued requiring Gould and his daughter to show cause
why they should not interplead to determine who was entitled to the proceeds and why the company should not be
permitted to pay the amount due into court. The Pennsylvania court directed that notice be given to Effie in California. This was done but she failed to appear to answer.
The insurance company, pursuant to court order to appear
or answer, paid the $2500 into court and all parties except Effie having appeared, a feigned issue was framed
and tried to determine the validity of the alleged transfer of the policy. On October 1, 1910, the jury found
that there was no valid assignment and thereupon under
court order the fund was paid over to Gould. In the
meantime the California action instituted by Effie had
been removed to a United States District Court. The insurance company answered in 1911 setting up inter alia. that
Effie was concluded by the aforesaid proceedings in Pennsylvania wherein the policy had been adjudged to be Gould's
property. After trial to the court in May 1912, judgment
was rendered in favor of Effie for the full amount claimed
which judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Thus New York Life found itself doubly liable on the same
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obligation-to Gould under the Pittsburgh order and to Effie
on the judgment in the California federal court. On appeal
from the latter judgment, the Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed, holding that Effie was not bound by the Pittsburgh
determination since she was not before that court, process of
the Pennsylvania courts not running beyond the boundaries
of the state. The same situation would have obtained in a
federal court since the claimants Gould and Dunlevy were
citizens of different states and the process of a federal court
ordinarily does not run beyond the borders of the state con3
taining the federal district in which the action is brought. 7
It was to obviate this difficulty that the Federal Interpleader Act of 1917 authorized insurance companies and
benefit societies to interplead in a United States District
Court when the claimants were citizens of different states,
and provided that the process of those courts might run into
all parts of the United States. The act was amended in
1925,38 and in 1926 it was repealed and a new and improved
statute enacted, extending its benefits to casualty and surety
companies. 39 A further significant provision of these acts,
which has continued down to the present, was that the
amount in controversy, unlike the general jurisdictional
minimum in diversity of citizenship cases, need be only $500.
"This legislation has worked admirably." So stated
Chafee in his article on Federal Interpleader published in
1936.40 But it was not admirable enough. First, its coverage was limited to the few types of corporations therein
listed; second, it did not extend to bills in the nature of
interpleader, but only to bills of strict interpleader, 4 1 so that
37 See FFn. R. Cirv. P. 4(f) : "All process other than a subpoena may be
served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district
court is held . . . ." See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Du Roure, 123 F. Supp.
736 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). "The difficulty with this position is that interpleader
is not an in rem proceeding. A binding judgment cannot be rendered against
anyone over whom personal jurisdiction cannot be acquired. This was established in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518. .. ." Id. at 740.
3s Act of Feb. 25, 1925, 43 Stat 276.

39 Act of May 8, 1926, 44 Stat 416.
40 Chafee, supra note 36, at 965.
41 Chafee points out that although the language of the earlier acts was
perhaps sufficiently broad to cover bills in the nature of interpleader, two cases
under the 1926 Act took the view that such bills were not within its terms.
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privity, for example, was necessary; third, the prerequisites
of interpleader had to be stated as averments in the bill,
rather than a fact to be proved; and fourth, it did not provide
for defensive interpleader in actions at law.
These omissions were supplied and other changes were
made in the 1936 act.42 Thus, it included bills of interpleader and bills in the nature of bills of interpleader filed
by any person, firm, corporation, association, or society having possession or custody of money or property of $500 or
more, or having issued a note, bond, certificate, policy of insurance, or other instrument of the value of $500 or more,
or providing for the delivery or payment or loan of money
or property of such amount or value, or being under any
obligation to the amount of $500 or more, if (1) two or more

Id. at 971.

These two cases were Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lusk, 46 F.2d

505 (W.D. La. 1930), and Klaber v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 F.2d 934 (8th
Cir. 1934). In the Pacific case the court said: "My opinion is that, in order
to vest this court with jurisdiction, the complainant must either confess its
entire liability under the policy for all that has accrued [which had not been
done], or it must first have that issue determined in a competent law court
before it can implead the respondents under the statute." Pacific Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Lusk, rpra at 509. In the Klaber case the casualty company had
issued its policy limited to $10,000 for all persons injured or killed in a single
accident. As a result of one accident, in which a truck had hit a bus, numerous
claims, far in excess of the $10,000 limit had been filed and the company
sought and was granted a bill of interpleader under the act. The appellate
court reversed, saying: "If the bill before us showed that the defendants
other than Klaber were bona fide adverse claimants against the company
within the meaning of the Interpleader Act, and that the company was a disinterested stakeholder, we would be inclined to hold that it might maintain
this suit under the act. . . . We are convinced, however, that, under the

allegations of the bill, Klaber was the only defendant who was an actual
claimant, and that the other defendants are persons who may become claimants depending upon whether they succeed in procuring judgments against the
assured or whether they do not.
"We are also convinced that the company is not a disinterested stakeholder.
It does not aver that it is. The facts pleaded show that it is not. It admits
no rights in the defendants other than Klaber to the fund, and no liability of
either itself or its assured to them. It occupies a position of active hostility
to all defendants except Klaber, and must, if it can, prevent their ever obtaining any claims against the fund. . . . Moreover, if it succeeds in defeating their claims against its assured, there will be about $6000 left in the
registry of the court after payment of the Klaber judgment, to which the
company alone will have a claim.
"Our conclusion is that the bill is not one which comes within the
Interpleader Act . . . ." Klaber v. Maryland Cas. Co., supra at 939. The
court went on to find too, that the bill could not be supported as one in the
nature of interpleader.
42 Act of Jan. 20, 1936, 49 Stat. 1096 (now 28 U.S.C. §2361 (1958)).
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adverse claimants, citizens of different states, are claiming
to be entitled to such money or property, or to any of the
benefits arising by virtue of any of the enumerated obligations; and (2) the complainant has deposited such money
or property or paid the amount or value of such other instrument or obligation into the registry of the court, or has
furnished bond to do so. The district court within whose
territorial jurisdiction one or more of such claimants reside
is given power, in addition to issuing process running into
all parts of the United States, to enjoin the claimants from
proceeding in any state or federal court on account of the
obligation of the party bringing suit. It was also provided
that such a suit in equity may be entertained although the
titles or claims of the conflicting claimants do not have a
common origin, or are not identical, but are adverse to and
independent of one another. The act also provided that in
any action at law in a United States district court against
any of the persons enumerated above, such defendant may
set up by way of equitable defense any matter which would
entitle such person to file an original or ancillary bill of interpleader or bill in the nature of interpleader in the same
court or in any other United States district court against the
plaintiff in such action at law and one or more other adverse
claimants. The defendant may join as parties to such equitable defense any claimants who are not already parties to
such action at law. The same provisions as to service of
process and injunctive relief are applicable to the equitable
defense.
In the codification and revision promulgated by the
Judicial Code of 1948, the provisions of the 1936 act were
distributed so that former section 41(26) 43 was spread over
three sections: section 1335 covering general jurisdiction,
section 1397 dealing with venue and section 2361 embracing
process and procedure. Subsection (e) of the 1936 act relating to the equitable defense in the nature of interpleader
and for the joinder of additional parties was omitted as

43 Ibid.
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being adequately covered by the Federal Rules of Civil
44
Procedure.
The question was presented shortly after enactment of
the 1936 act whether Congress thereby had, in a sense, preempted the field, so that interpleader under general equity
principles would no longer lie. The Ninth Circuit held that:
it was not the intent of the interpleader act, in its original or amended
form, to abrogate the right to bring suits in interpleader in the federal courts under the general provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1). That
right had long been exercised . . . Rather, the statute was intended
to afford a remedy in situations where interpleader had theretofore
been unavailable because of the impossibility of haling before a court
claimants residing beyond its territorial jurisdiction. ... 45 Accordingly, we hold that the lower court bad jurisdiction to entertain the
interpleader suit under the general power conferred by 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 41 (1).46

This holding is now reflected in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 22, laying down the modern rule of interpleader, 47 which in subparagraph (2) provides that the
"remedy herein provided is in addition to and in no way
supersedes or limits the remedy provided by Title 28, U.S.C..
Sections 1335, 1397, and 2361." 48
THE STATUTORY INTERPLEADER: DIvERSITY
OF CITIZENSHIP

The question of diversity of citizenship requires special
consideration since the 1936 act provides that only diverse
44 Reviser's note to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 2361 (1958). See FED. R. CiV. P. 22.
45 Cf. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916), discussed

in text accompanying notes 36-37 su~pra.
46 Security Trust & Say. Bank v. Walsh, 91 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1937);
accord, Mallers v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 87 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 685 (1937).
47 Rule 22 is discussed infra.
48 Rossetti v. Hill, 162 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1947), noted in 172 A.L.R. 821;
Johnson v. Remy, 220 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1955); Ellington v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 217 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1954) ; John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Kraft, 200 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1953); Bank of China v. Wells
Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953); Republic
of China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1952); Agricultural Ins. Co. v. The Lido of Worcester, 63 F. Supp. 799 (D. Mass.
1945) ; Harris v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Pa. 1941);
cf. Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (lst Cir. 1955), discussed infra.
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citizenship of the claimants is required. 49 To the extent that
the act deals with strict interpleader, i.e., where the plaintiff
is a mere stakeholder, the Supreme Court held in Treinies v.
Sunshine Mining 0o.0 that diversity among the claimants
is sufficient since the controversy is in fact solely between
them; and the fact that the stakeholder and one of the claimants are citizens of the same state is of no moment. In that
case, one Amelia Pelkes died testate in the State of Washington in 1922. By her will three-quarters of her estate was
to go to her second husband, John, a citizen of Washington,
and one-quarter to her daughter by a previous marriage,
Katherine Mason, a citizen of Idaho. Among the assets of
the estate was a large block of Sunshine Mining stock, which
at that time was regarded as almost worthless. Sunshine
was incorporated under the laws of the State of Washington.
Allegedly in accordance with the oral wishes of the decedent,
Pelkes and Mason made their own distribution of one-half
to each, the Sunshine stock being put, however, in Pelkes'
name exclusively. Pelkes assigned the whole block to Evelyn
Treinies purportedly on the ground that she had promised to
support him in his old age. Treinies was a citizen of
Washington.
As a result of a silver strike, the stock had by that time
become valuable and Mason sued in an Idaho state court,
personal jurisdiction of all the parties including Sunshine
having been obtained, to impose a trust on one-half of the
stock now held by Treinies and for an accounting. While
this action was still pending, Mason filed a petition in the
Superior Court in Washington where Amelia Pelkes' will
had been probated, to remove the executor, John Pelkes, for
failure to file his report of distribution and for dissipation
of the Sunshine stock. Pelkes by cross-petition claimed the
stock. Thereupon Mason applied to the Supreme Court of
Washington for a writ of prohibition against further proceedings in the Washington court on the ground of lack of

49 See note 42 supra.
so 308 U.S. 66 (1939).

This case is discussed in Chafee, Federal Inter-

pleader Since the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 393 (1940).
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jurisdiction in that court to determine the controversy over
the stock. The writ was refused, and on May 31, 1935, judgment was entered in the Washington court upholding in full
the ownership of Pelkes. This judgment came down before
the Idaho case had reached the Idaho Supreme Court. That
court, considering the Washington decree, held that the
Washington court never had jurisdiction of the subject matter, and that, therefore, its judgment was void. All the stock
was awarded to Mason. 5 1 Certiorari to the Supreme Court
of Idaho was refused by the Supreme Court of the United
States. 52 Pelkes and Treinies then filed a suit in the Washington Superior Court against Mason and Sunshine alleging
that they were the owners of the stock, and that the Idaho
decree was invalid for lack of jurisdiction; and asking that
their title to the stock be quieted and that Sunshine be compelled to recognize their ownership. Sunshine, to protect itself against these conflicting judgments as to the ownership
of the stock, then filed its bill of interpleader under the
Interpleader Act of 1936 53 in the United States District
Court of Idaho. Further proceedings in the Washington suit
to quiet title were enjoined by the District Court. The interpleader suit resulted in a judgment in favor of Mason,"
which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 55 The Supreme
Court affirmed.
Putting aside the fascinating questions of res judicata
and re-litigation which were also involved in the case,5 6
we concern ourselves here solely with the issue of diversity
of citizenship in the interpleader suit, namely: does cocitizenship between the stakeholder, Sunshine, a Washington corporation and one group of claimants, Treinies
and Pelkes, citizens of Washington, bar statutory interpleader, even though the adverse claimant Mason is a
citizen of Idaho? Although this question was not raised

51 Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, 59 P.2d 1087 (1936).
52

Pelkes v. Mason, 299 U.S. 615 (1937).

53Act of Jan. 20, 1936, 49 Stat. 1096 (now 28 U.S.C. §2361 (1958)).
54 Sunshine Mining Co. v. Treinies, 19 F. Supp. 587 (D. Idaho 1937).
55
56

Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 99 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1938).
Chafee discusses these problems in his article =pra note 50, at 398.
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by the petitioner in the United States Supreme Court, that
Court considered it ex mxero motu, saying:
Under the Interpleader Act, this identity of citizenship is permissible
since diversity only between claimants is required. The Interpleader
Act is based upon the clause of § 2, Article III, of the Constitution
which extends the judical [sic] power of the United States to controversies "between citizens of different States." Is this grant of
jurisdiction broad enough to cover the present situation?
The Judicial Code, § 24,57 provides for original jurisdiction of
suits of a civil nature between citizens of different states in precisely
the language of the Constitution. The present wording is practically
the same as that of the Act of March 3, 1875,58 "the circuit courts
...shall have original cognizance... of all suits .. .in which there
shall be a controversy between citizens of different States," and that
of the original Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, 59 "the suit is
between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen
of another State." Without ruling as to possible limitations of the
constitutional grant, it is held by this Court that the statutory language of the respective judiciary acts forbids suits in the federal courts
unless all the parties on one side are of citizenship diverse to those on
the other side. 60 For the determination of the validity of the Interpleader Act we need not decide whether the words of the Constitution, "Controversies . . .between Citizens of different States," have
a different meaning from that given by judicial construction to similar
words in the Judiciary Act. Even though the constitutional language
limits the judicial power to controversies wholly between citizens of
different states, the requirement is satisfied here. 61
This is for the reason that there is a real controversy between
the adverse claimants. They are brought into court by the complainant stakeholder who simultaneously deposits the money or property,
due and involved in the dispute, into the registry of the court. This
was done in this case. The Act provides that the "court shall hear
and determine the cause and shall discharge the complainant from

57

Now 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).

58 18 Stat. 470.

59 1 Stat. 78.

60 Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308, 312 (1919); Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457

(1879); Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 553
(1873); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
61 Cf. Chafee, Interpleader in the United States Courts, 41 YALEz LJ. 1134,
1141, 1165 (1932); Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936, 45 YA.z
L.J. 963, 973 (1936).
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further liability." Such deposit and discharge effectually demonstrates the applicant's disinterestedness as between the claimants and
as to the property in dispute, 62 an essential in interpleaders. 63 The
complainant is a proper party for the determination of the controversy
between the adverse claimants, citizens of different states. Their controversy could have been settled by litigation between them in the
federal courts. Under similar circumstances as to parties, this Court
ruled [64] that a removal of separable controversies to the federal court
was permissible even though a proper defendant was a citizen of the
same state as the plaintiff. 65
The Treinies case,6 6 dealing with a strict interpleader
situation, held, as we have seen, "without ruling on possible
limitations on the constitutional grants," that where there
is complete diversity of citizenship between the adverse claimants, the citizenship of the noncontesting stakeholder is
immaterial.
Assuming, however, that there is not complete diversity
of citizenship among the adverse claimants, may the federal
court take jurisdiction in view of the rule pronounced long
ago by Chief Justice Marshall in Strawbridge v. Curtiss ,7
that the citizenship of all parties plaintiff must differ from
that of all parties defendant?
The rather ambiguous language of the Interpleader Act
providing that district courts shall have original jurisdiction
if "two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship ...
are claiming," 68 seems to run counter to the CUirtiss rule.
62 Diversity requirements for federal equity jurisdiction to avoid a multiplicity of suits from diverse claimants with claims contested by the debtor are
not involved. Cf. Di Giovanni v. Camden Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 70 (1935).
13 Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 200 (1934); Killian
v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U.S. 568, 571 (1884). But nota bene that the requirement
of disinterestedness is now no longer a requisite either under 28 U.S.C. § 1335
or under FED. R. Civ. P. 22, despite the cryptic statements in Federal Life
Ins. Co. v. Tietsort, 131 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 768
(1943) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Whitler, 172 F.2d 631 (7th Cir. 1949),
and Pure Oil Co. v. Ross, 170 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1948).
64 Barney v. Lathan, 103 U.S. 205, 213 (1880) ; cf. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins,
305 U.S. 534, 538 (1939).
65 Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 71-72 (1939) (footnotes
supplemented and renumbered from original). See 24 MINN. L. REV. 416
(1940).
66 See note 65, supra.
67 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
See other cases cited in note 60 supra.
6828 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (1) (1958).
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In Dzugas v. American Sur. Co.,6 9 decided before Treinies,

the surety company had filed a bill of interpleader under
the Interple-ader Act of 1926 70 against numerous claimants
alleging that "two or more of whom are citizens of different

States." The record shows that there was not complete
diversity of citizenship among the various claimants, quite
a number of them being citizens of the same state. The
Supreme Court, however, took jurisdiction without comment, the jurisdictional question apparently not having
been raised.

A number of lower courts have held, citing the

Dugas case, that it was not necessary that there be complete diversity of citizenship among all the adverse claim-

ants, since all that the statute requires is that there be
two or more adverse claimants of diverse citizenship. 71 The
rather recent Fifth Circuit decision of Haynes v. Felder72

presents a full view of the problems. As appears from the interpleader complaint filed under Title 28, U.S.C., Section

1335 by the First National Bank of Dallas, which for
jurisdictional purposes is considered a citizen of Texas,73
69 300 U.S. 414 (1937).
70 44 Stat. 416.

1 United States v. Sentinel Fire Ins. Co., 178 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1949).
"The lack of neutrality in these circumstances seems to differentiate this case
in one respect from the case of Cramer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.... But
the Cramer case strongly supports our view that all the adverse claimants are
not required to be citizens of different states." Id. at 223; Railway Express
Agency v. Jones, 106 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1939). "It was not necessary that
there be complete diversity of citizenship among all the adverse claimants." Id.
at 344; Cramer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 F.2d 141 (8th Cir. 1937),
ccrt. denied, 302 U.S. 739 (1937) ; Blackmar v. Mackay, 65 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.
N.Y. 1946). "Professor Chafee, the draftsman of the 1936 Act, approves of
such interpretation for in an article written immediately after the adoption of
the 1936 Act in 45 Yale L.J. at page 975 he stated: 'Jurisdiction exists if the
statute can be construed to require only that two adverse claimants must be
citizens of different states. Such an interpretation conforms to the general
purpose of the 1936 Act, that the United States courts should be given power
to settle all interpleader cases that cannot be handled by the state courts.
This view is supported by five cases under the 1917 and 1926 Acts, which
granted interpleaders where some antagonistic claimants were apparently cocitizens. The liberal attitude adopted by the courts in giving relief under
former interpleader acts may be adopted as well toward the Act of 1936."
Id. at 51; Girard Trust Co. v. Vance, 5 F.R.D. 109 (E.D.Pa. 1946) (in this
case plaintiff had a partial interest). Cf. Boice v. Boice, 135 F.2d 919 (3d Cir.
1943) ; Note, Diversity of Citizenship; The InterpleaderAct, 63 HARV. L. Rm,.
866 (1950).
72 239 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1957).
7328 U.S.C. § 1348 (1958).
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one Davis found a cache of $43,430 in the basement of the
house of William Felder. This money was taken from
Davis by the sheriff and deposited in the plaintiff bank
awaiting disposition. William Felder and his three sisters
entered a claim to this fund. Their claim was joint, as
next of kin of their father, the builder and former occupant of the house. A Mrs. Elsie Haynes also asserted a
claim for this amount claiming that Davis had taken the
money from her deceased husband. The defendants named
in the interpleader were Davis, a Texan, Mrs. Haynes,
also a citizen of Texas, William Felder and two of his
sisters, citizens of Texas, and the third sister, a citizen of
Tennessee. Davis later abandoned his claim, leaving the
real issue between Mrs. Haynes on the one hand, and the
four Felders on the other hand. The District Court, on
motion for summary judgment, sustained the Felder claim.
It also entered a permanent injunction against any further
proceedings in a state court.74 Mrs. Haynes appealed, assailing the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that
the requisite diversity of citizenship was lacking. The
Court of Appeals propounded the question as follows: "[Clan
a Texas plaintiff who is merely a stakeholder asserting no
claim to the property bring interpleader against two rival
sets of claimants, consisting of a citizen of Texas on the one
side, opposed by four joint claimants of whom three are citizens of Texas, and one is a citizen of Tennessee?" 75
Since Chief Justice Marshall construed the original diversity statute 76 in Strawbridge v. (urtiss, 77 as requiring
each party to have such citizenship that he could sue in
diversity every other actual or indispensable party properly aligned against him, 78 and further, since this requirement has been held applicable to nonstatutory interpleader,7 9 the court held that it was clear that such a
4

As authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1958).

75 Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1957).

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).

73Now

777

78
City of Indianapolis v. Chase Natl Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941).
79
Security Trust & Say. Bank v. Walsh, 91 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1937).
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proceeding could not be brought as a diversity action under
section 1332 of title 28.
Thus the only basis of federal jurisdiction here which is, or might
be, claimed is the Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335....
This statute does not appear to require any diversity between
the plaintiff and the defendant-claimants, and such an interpretation
of the similarly conceived 1936 Interpleader Act was held to be both
correct and constitutional in Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.80
However, as the Court there held, the Act is bottomed on the diversity jurisdiction of the United States courts, permitted by Art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1 (7) of the Constitution,81 and thus it was necessary for
Congress to specify some alternative form of diversity on which
jurisdiction in particular cases could be grounded. This it did in
the present Act by requiring "claimants, of diverse citizenship."
The question therefore is whether the diversity here existing
among the claimants is sufficient to support jurisdiction. It might
first of all be noted that there is insufficient diversity among the
claimants to permit a regular diversity suit between them for even
after Davis, also a Texan, was dismissed as a party to the suit, the
two remaining interests were represented by a Texan on one side
and three Texans and a Tennessean on the other. It might further
be noted that this case appears to present the absolute minimum
degree of diversity that can arise, especially when one considers
that the plaintiff also was a Texas citizen. It must therefore be
asked first whether this minimal diversity meets the statutory requirement, and second whether the statute so interpreted would be
82
constitutional.

In answer to the first question, the court observed that
under statutory interpleader four situations might be present dependent upon the different forms or degrees of diversity among claimants in multiparty actions: (1) com-

plete diversity, (2)

diversity by alignment, (3)

partial

diversity, and (4) minimal diversity. After reviewing the
decisions heretofore cited,8 3 the text writers, and the stat80 308 U.S. 66 (1939).

See text accompanying notes 50-65 swpra.

81 "The judicial power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between citi-

zens of different States... !
82 Haynes v. Felder, supra note 75, at 871 (footnotes renumbered from
original).
s3 Cases cited note 71 supra.
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ute itself, the court held that this "complete diversity"
rule had been rejected as inapplicable to statutory interpleader suits but:
[I]t still must be agreed, we think, that it is not easy to determine
precisely how "incomplete" a diversity among claimants has actually
been sanctioned by the cases. This problem arises from the fact
that though the courts and the text writers have stated that complete
diversity would not be required they have not specifically catalogued
and dealt with each of the several possible forms of incomplete
diversity ....
84 [And since] there is nothing in the language or
history of the Act that suggests that Congress did not intend to
cover all instances of diversity among claimants, whether "complete"
or incomplete, .

.

. there would seem to be every reason to suppose

that Congress in this area was willing to grant the federal courts
jurisdiction to the actual limits of the constitutional mandate.8 5
As to whether the statute so interpreted would be
constitutional, the court held:
The language of the constitutional provision, "Controversies .

.

. be-

tween citizens of different States," would permit even the most liberal
"minimum diversity" test, since, at least in part, it involves such a
controversy. The courts have in fact permitted ancillary and separable suits between parties not asserting diverse citizenship, where
their controversy was tied to one over which the courts did have
diversity jurisdiction ...
No Supreme Court decision has limited the generality of these
words in the Constitution. It has nowhere been held that Strawbridge v. Curtiss 86 set down the outer limits of jurisdiction under
them, or that it did anything more than interpret the meaning of the
Judiciary Act then before it; the unjustifiable extension of that case
in another direction has long been criticized and rejected by the
Supreme Court in Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson.8 7
The Supreme Court, in Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.88 itself
raised the question whether the Constitution might not have granted
Congress broader power to legislate than it had exercised in the
84Haynes v. Felder, supra note 75, at 873 (footnotes renumbered from
original).
85
d. at 875.
867 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
87 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 553-55 (1844).
88 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
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Judiciary Act. We think it did so, and we think Congress now by
the Interpleader Act of 1948 has exercised part, if not all, of this
reserved power to give additional jurisdiction to the federal courts
in this limited but very important field of interpleader.8 9
What have the courts held where the stakeholder is

not completely disinterested, i.e., a case "in the nature of
interpleader," included in section 1335 of title 28 and also

in the Interpleader Act of 1936? Under this provision it
seems clear, assuming that the monetary minimum prescribed therein is present, that a federal district court
would have jurisdiction of a case where an interested stakeholder, a citizen of State A, sues two claimants, one a
citizen of State B and the other a citizen of State C; in

fact, the rule of complete diversity of citizenship laid down
in Strawbridge v. Curtiss9 0 is also complied with.9 1

Like-

wise, the requirements of this provision seem to be met
where the interested stakeholder, a citizen of State A, brings
suit against two claimants, one a citizen of State A and

the other a citizen of State B, the monetary minimum required under the statute being present. But is the rule
of the Strawbridge case violated, thus preventing a possible
constitutional problem? 92 This question has not yet been
89 Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868, 875-76 (5th Cir. 1957) ; 45 CALIF. L. REv.
543 (1957); 42 CoRmEL L.Q. 570 (1957); 55 Mica. L. REv. 1183 (1957).

See also Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Court,
71 HARV. L. REv. 874, 913 (1958).
907 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
92 Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Baker, 105 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1939) (note
that the amount in controversy exceeded $3000). See also Holcomb v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 228 F.2d 75 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 986 (1956)
(here again the amount in controversy exceeded $3000); General Am. Life
Ins. Co. v. Floom, 96 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (less than $3000); John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kegan, 22 F. Supp. 326 (D. Md. 1938) (here
again the amount in controversy exceeded $3000).
92 See Peterfreund, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv.
752, 753 n.6 (1956): "The problem is essentially this: is the requirement
of complete diversity between all the parties on one side of a controversy and
all the parties on the other side, established by Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 267 (1806), as a legislative mandate, likewise a requirement under
art. III § 2 of the Constitution? The Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952)
use the same words, controversy between citizens of different States. Should
the constitutional language be given not only a different and broader meaning
than similar words in the Judiciary Act of 1789 but also a different and
broader meaning than the identical words of subsequent statutes?"
The question was before the First Circuit in Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220
F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955), where it was considered but not resolved, the court
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resolved by the Supreme Court. 93
THE FEDERAL INTERPLFADER ACTS--ANCILLARY
JURISDICTION

Where interpleader is ancillary to an action properly
founded on diversity of citizenship, it has been held that
it may be brought in a federal court even though co-citizenship of some of the parties would have otherwise defeated
federal jurisdiction. 94 And, if the interpleader is by way
of counterclaim arising out of the same subject matter as
plaintiff's claim, i.e., a compulsory counterclaim,9" it requires no independent basis of federal jurisdiction. 9 6
The A/S KrediitPank v. Chase Manhattan Bank case 9was based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, since the
original action was between an alien plaintiff and a citizen
of New York. By interpleading the aliens A, B, John Doe
and Richard Roe and the State Bank of the U.S.S.R., the
remaining controversy would be wholly between aliens:
ergo, argued the plaintiff, the court is deprived of jurisdicnot finding it necessary to provide the answer to the constitutional question.
"The reason for this is that we find another basis for federal jurisdiction."
Id. at 113. See Note, Diversity of Citizenship: The Interpleader Act, 63
HARV. L. REv. 866 (1950), and the 1948 revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (1) :
"Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in section 1332
of this title ... "
93 See persuasive argument that the Constitution granted Congress broader
power to legislate respecting diversity jurisdiction than it had exercised in
the Judiciary Act. Haynes v. Felder, supra note 89.
94 Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, szpra note 92; Sherman Nat'l Bank v. Shubert
Theatrical Co., 238 Fed. 225, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1916), aff'd, 247 Fed. 256 (2d Cir.
1917). See also Republic of China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d 230,
234 (2d Cir. 1952); Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 56 F.2d
385 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed sub nom. Marine Midland Trust Co. v.
Eybro Corp., 58 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1932); Harris v. Travelers Ins. Co., 40
F. Supp. 154, 156 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Ciechanowicz v. Bowery Say. Bank, 19
F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
95 FE. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
96 Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609-11 (1926) ; United
Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prods. Inc., 221 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1955). "We
conclude that, in the case of a counterclaim which is compulsory, ancillary jurisdiction should extend to additional parties, regardless of an ensuing lack of
diversity." Id. at 216; Aberdeen Hosiery Mills Co. v. Kaufman, 113 F. Supp.
833, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United States v. American Sur. Co., 25 F. Supp.
700, 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1938), aff'd, 142 F.Zd 726, 728 (2d Cir. 1944); Ciechanowicz v. Bowery Say. Bank, supra note 94.
97 155 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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tion.9 8

The court, however, relying on the doctrine of ancil-

lary jurisdiction concluded: "The original diversity jurisdiction of the court over the action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
[the basic diversity of citizenship statute] is not destroyed
by the order allowing interpleader and the initial jurisdiction
of the original suit is sufficient ....1)99
THn FEDERAL INTEnPLEADER

CITIzENSmP UNDER TH

AcTs:

DIviERSIT

Or

1948 CODIFICATION

Until the codification of title 28 in 1948, the only diversity jurisdiction provided for in the Interpleader Acts

was that of diversity of citizenship between citizens of the
states of the United States. Now, section 1335 encompasses the citizenship prescribed in section 1332-the basic

diversity of citizenship statute-in view of the clause now
contained in section 1335(a) (1):

"two or more adverse

claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in section 1332
of this title ...."

Thus, within the Interpleader Act there

are now to be included under the term "adverse claimants
of diverse citizenship," citizens of the states, of the District of Columbia, of the territories and of the Common-

wealth of Puerto Rico. 10 0

It would also seem that citizens

of foreign states may be included, conditioned on the long

recognized rule that aliens of diverse citizenship may not
be adverse parties to actions bottomed on diversity of
citizenship. 101

98 Id. at 36.

991bid. The court cited John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kraft, 200
F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1953); Republic of China v. American Express Co., 195
F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1952); Kerrigan's Estate v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 199 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1952).
o028 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
01 Jackson v. Twentyman, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 136 (1829) ; Hodgson & Thompson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); Kavourgias v. Nicholaou
Co., 148 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1945). See also Ex parte Edelstein, 30 F.2d 636,
638 (2d Cir. 1929). The rule is otherwise where jurisdiction is founded on
a substantial federal question. Doidge v. Cunard S.S. Co., 19 F2d 500 (lst
Cir. 1927). But see A/S Krediit Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 155 F. Supp.
30 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (defensive interpleader under Fmn. R. Civ. P. 20).
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THE FEDERAL INTERPLEADER ACTS: INDEPENDENT LIABILITY

Another question that still seems to be in flux arises
where the stakeholder, although not a so-called interested
party in the interpleader, is claimed to be liable to one or
more of the interpleaded parties on an independent liability. 02 In addition to including the bill in the nature of
interpleader, section 1335 of title 28 provides that an interpleader action "may be entertained although the titles or
claims of the conflicting claimants do not have a common
origin, or are identical, but are adverse to and independent
of one another." 103 Under the Interpleader Act of 1926,
which did not bring within its scope the bill in the nature
of interpleader and hence contained no provision similar to
the one just quoted,1 4 it was held that if such an asserted
independent liability existed, interpleader would be denied. 10 5 But in order to determine this fact, the court
would first try this issue, and, if no such liability was found,
interpleader would be allowed.'0 6 This holding was followed, after the enactment of the Interpleader Act of 1936,
without noting the difference in language between the two
acts.107

This brings us to the case of Hurlbut v. Shell Oil Co.,10s
where the situation was the following:
Hurlbut had
sued Shell Oil to collect one-eighth royalties under an oil
lease on Hurlbut's land. Shell admitted liability for the
royalties, but asserted that various other parties were claiming the same fund, and therefore interpleaded Hurlbut
with such other parties. Hurlbut and the third parties

See text accompanying notes 10, 23-25 supra.
10328 U.S.C. § 1335(b) (1958). See Chafee, Federal Interpleader Since the
102

Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 412 (1940) ; Note, 26 GEo. L.J. 1017, 1021-22
(1938).
104 44 Stat. 416.
105 Dee v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 86 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1936).
106 Ibid.
107 Equitable

Life Ins. Co. v. Gilman, 14 F.R.D. 243 (W.D. Mo. 1953);
First State Bank v. Citizens State Bank, 10 F.R.D. 424 (D. Neb. 1950).
108 131 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. La. 1955).
This case serves as the "lead-off"
for an able law review Note: The Independent Liability Rule as a Bar to
Interpleader in the Federal Courts, 65 YALE L.J. 715 (1956).
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moved to vacate the order of interpleader on the ground
that Shell was "independently liable" to them aside from

the validity of their royalty claims.10 9 The court granted
the motion and dismissed the counterclaim for interpleader,

although it expressly recognized that under the Interpleader
Act of 1936, the old rule of independent liability is not mentioned, and that "leading textbook authorities seem to support" the contention "that the old rule has been abandoned."

Relying on the three earlier cases just. considered," 0 the
court stated that "this court adheres to the principle that
the nonexistence of independent liability in favor of the interpleaded party and against the party seeking interpleader is
still an essential element of this equitable remedy." 1"1 Its
conclusion seems erroneous in the light of the provisions of
section 1335 quoted above," 2 the history of the Interpleader
Act of 1936,1 3 and the provisions of Rule 22(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Hurlbut decision goes even beyond the independent
liability rule as followed in the Dee case, which stated that
if interpleader were opposed on the ground of independent
liability, the court would take evidence, determine that issue,
and dismiss only if such liability were shown. 11 4

"I hold,"

said the court in Hurlbut,that:
[T]he question as to whether or not there is independent liability
does not necessitate a trial by me of that question, but only a determination by me that as a matter of law there is or there is not a
genuine issue as to law or fact. Flimsy or transparent contentions

109 The opinion does not set forth the basis for the independent liability, but,
according to the Yale Note adverted to in note 108 supra: "The allegations
of independent liability . . . were based on the theories that (1) Shell had
negligently classified the oil wells on claimants' lands; (2) Shell had incorrectly classified the wells and in so doing had prejudiced the third party claimants; and (3) Shell had violated certain development clauses in the third
parties' lease. Supplemental Memorandum for Defendants, p. 9, Hurlbut v.
Shell Oil Co... " Id. at 716 n. 12.
110 Dee v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., supra note 105; Equitable Life Ins.
Co. v. Gilman and First State Bank v. Citizens State Bank, supra note 107.
11
Hurlbut v. Shell Oil Co., 131 F. Supp. 466, 468 (W.D. La. 1955).
112 See text accompanying note 103 mtpra.
113 Note, The Independent Liability Rule as a Bar to Interpleader in the
Federal Courts, 65 YALE L.J. 715, 719 (1956).
114 See Dee v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 86 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1936).
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of independent liability do not create genuine issues. The independent
liability of Shell hinges in part on questions of Louisiana law not yet
settled by our state courts, and we certainly cannot say as a matter
of law that there is no independent liability. Because I believe that
the question of independent liability involves a complicated question
of law, and the decision thereon depends upon an inquiry into the
surrounding facts and circumstances, it is my opinion that the interpleader should be dismissed and the parties freed to assert their respective claims in courts of their own choice. This court is not holding
that independent liability exists. It is merely holding that there is
a substantial question of fact and law to be determined on the
issue ....
I do not believe any legal prejudice will result to any one
as a result of the court's action here. The prospect of further litigation over these leases on independent matters in other courts is
not legal prejudice. That litigation, if it were to be entertained here,
would unduly delay the hearing of plaintiffs' original suit until the
conclusion of litigation on the question of independent liability, which
litigation gives every promise of being protracted." 15

The Note above cited, 116 criticizing the Hurlbut decision,
argued that it was based on the Dee case, 1" 7 which, it asserted,
had in effect been overruled by the act of 1936."18 Actually,
the Note concedes that literally the act did not do so, but it
"explicitly eliminated the ancient interpleader requirement
of privity between the claimants, believing that this step
necessarily eliminated the independent liability rule." "19 Be

115Hurlbut v. Shell Oil Co., supra note 111, at 469.

This conclusion seems

somewhat confused. First, if the real problem is that the "independent liability
of Shell hinges in part on the questions of Louisiana law not yet settled by
our State courts," why does the district court fail to follow the mandate of
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943) that in all diversity cases
involving the jurisdictional amount, the federal court must decide questions
of state law although the highest court of the state has not answered them?
The answers are difficult and the character of the answers which the highest
state courts may ultimately give remain uncertain. Second, regardless of
the Meredith case, if the question of independent liability involves problems
of law or fact, why does the district court refrain from determining those
questions in view of the rather clear directions of § 1335? See Note,
The Independent Liability Rile as a Bar to Interpleaderin the Federal Courts,
supra note 113, at 717, and the sound holding of Jersey Ins. Co. of New York

v. Altieri, 5 N.J. Super. 577, 68 A.2d 852 (Ch. Div. 1949).
110 Supra note 113.
117

Dee v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., suipra note 114.

Act of January 20, 1936, ch. 13(1), 49 Stat. 1096.
"1 SuPra note 113, at 719.
118
9
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that as it may, rule 22 (Interpleader) seems to have accomplished this result:
(1) It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the claims
of the several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend
do not have a common origin or are not identical but are adverse to
and independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that he is
not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants ...
The provisions of this rule supplement and do not in any way limit
the joinder of parties permitted in Rule 20.
(2) The remedy herein provided is in addition to and in no way
supersedes or limits the remedy provided by Title 28, U.S.C., §§ 1335,
1397, and 2361. Actions under those provisions shall be conducted
in accordance with these rules.' 20

It is to be noted that rule 22, although adopting the language of the act of 1936, added a clause, namely, that it is
not ground for objection to the joinder "that the plaintiff
avers that he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all
of the claimants." This apparent difference in wording between the act of 1936 121 and federal rule 22 was stressed by
the court in GirardTrust Jo. v. Vance, 22 where certain of the
interpleaded defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were
under an independent liability to them. Having carefully
analyzed the facts at the so-called first stage, 1 23 the court held
that the plaintiffs were not under any independent liability
to these defendants and then continued:

120 "In fact, this [rule 22] is interpleader with the shackles of the requirements such as privity, no interest in the stake, and so on, taken away, and
made freely available either as a claim or a counterclaim or otherwise. There
is really no necessity for having a separate rule on interpleader here, in view
of the broad provisions of Rule 20 on general joinder, for that includes all
that is authorized by the interpleader rule." PROCEEDINGS OF THE WASHINGTON
D.C. INsTrnum ON FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 66 (1938).
See also
Wright, Joinder of Claims and Partiesunder Modern Pleading Rides, 36 MINN.
L. Rnv. 580, 621-22 (1952).
121 Now 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1958).
222 5 F.R.D. 109 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
123 The court first held that an action in interpleader is conducted in two
stages. In the first, the court must determine whether plaintiff is entitled to
interplead the defendants and may take evidence for that purpose. The second
is between the respective defendants on their adverse claims. Girard Trust Co.
v. Vance, 5 F.R.D. 109, 114 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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If this action were governed by the provisions of Rule 22(2), much
of the foregoing would have been unnecessary, because the Rule provides that it is not ground for objection "that the plaintiff avers that
he is not liable in the whole or in part to any or all of the claimants."
Rule 22(1). In this, the basis for relief under the Rule is broader
than that under the Interpleader Act of 1936 . . . for the provision

above quoted does not appear in the statute. However, this Court
can not entertain this action as one under the Rules, because the
jurisdictional basis of complete diversity between the plaintiffs and
the defendants is not present. .

.

. An action under Rule 22 is like

any other civil action based on the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, and the ordinary rules of jurisdiction govern. .

.

. Of

course, the broad provisions of the Rule cannot be engrafted upon
the Interpleader Act because, to do so, would be to extend the jurisdiction of the federal courts, a result which the Rules expressly
exclude.

See Rule 82.124

If the court's conclusion that the provisions of rule 22 (1)
and (2) are not applicable to actions under statutory interpleader is correct, an unfortunate disparity of meaning in
two statutes attempting to regulate the selfsame subject results. It would seem, however, that the court's construction
was too limited in its scope. 1 25 Holcomb v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 12 6 as stated in the opinion, 12 7 and also in counsels'
briefs, 1 28 was an action in the nature of interpleader under
section 1335 of title 28. Some of the defendants, citing the
Girard Trust Co. decision 129 as authority, contended that
statutory interpleader would not be extended by rule 22.
The plaintiff, relying on the express words of the rule,
30
claimed that it alone disposed of defendants' contention,
and also stated that the law was clear that an action in the
nature of interpleader would lie even though the plaintiff in

124
125

Id. at 113-14.

See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45
(1946).
126228 F.2d 75 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 986 (1956).
127 Id. at 79-80.
12s Brief for Appellant, p. 38, Brief for Appellee, pp. 22-23, Holcomb v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra note 126. It appears, however, that the district
court also had jurisdiction of the action as one of equitable interpleader on
the basis of diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952).
129 Brief for Appellant, p. 38.

130 Brief for Appellee, pp. 22-23.
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the interpleader action was seeking to defeat liability to one
or all of the interpleaded claimants. 131 The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit adopted the plaintiff's construction
without adverting to the Girarddecision. 32
However, as seems obvious, this question of independent
liability to one of the claimants continues to crop up. In
A~erican-Hawaiia?S.S. Co. v. Bowring & Co., 133 a case decided in 1957 under section 1335, plaintiff had sold two vessels to the same purchaser. Two groups or pairs of brokers
claimed the commissions due. One group, however, opposed
the interpleader on the "independent liability" ground that
a commission was due them in any event, irrespective of
whether they had procured the sale, and even though the
plaintiff might also be liable to the other group of brokers.
The court held a trial necessary as part of the first stage of
the interpleader proceeding.
If upon such a trial the portion of the counterclaim alleging the
independent liability is found to have no merit then the complaint
in interpleader will be sustained, the plaintiff may be discharged on
just terms, each of the defendant pairs will be required to state its
own claims and answer the claims of the other so as to join issue,
and in due course proofs will be taken on the prospective claims as
between the defendants....
However, should the independent liability of the plaintiff to the
Ocean Freighting-General Steamship pair be established upon the
preliminary trial, the interpleader complaint would, of course, be
dismissed and the Ocean Freighting-General Steamship pair would
proceed to judgment on its counterclaim in accordance with its proofs.
The Bowring-Smith & Johnson pair would then be free to pursue
such remedies against plaintiff on its claim for commissions as it
might be advised.
Thus the office of interpleader-which is not so much to protect
against double liability as against double vexation in respect to a
34
will be fully served.'
single liability ....
131 Brief for Appellee, p. 27, citing inter alia: Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S.
398 (1939) ; Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Baker, 105 F2d 578 (8th Cir. 1939);
Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y v. Maloney, 85 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Mo. 1948).
13
2 Holcomb v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., szpra note 127.
133 150 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).

134

Id. at 455.
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In Poland v. Atlantis Credit Corp.,135 the same judge
applied the same reasoning, although the number of parties
and problems was much greater. The following are the
salient facts in the case: the S.S. St. Nicholas, having been
stranded and reduced to a constructive total loss, Supreme,
the owner, and Atlantis, the mortgagee, separately sued the
insurers on the policies involved in the New York Supreme
Court for New York County. The state court actions were
settled separately. The Atlantis settlement was in writing
for eighty per cent of the claim, roughly $570,000, and provided for payment of such sum to Atlantis on a date certain,
in default whereof entry of judgment would follow. The
Supreme settlement was accomplished by oral agreement of
counsel. However, a few days later the attorneys for
Supreme sent a letter to the attorneys for the insurers confirming that the suit was settled for $74,000 "on the same
terms and conditions as the settlement" in the case of
Atlantis.
A dispute having arisen as to who was entitled to the
$74,000, the insurers brought the present action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
under the Federal Interpleader Act and rule 22,136 against
defendants Supreme, Atlantis and about twenty creditors of
Supreme (against whom a petition in bankruptcy had been
filed). They alleged that the various defendants claimed to
be entitled to all or part of the $74,000 deposited in the court
registry. Defendant Atlantis moved to dismiss the interpleader action on the ground that interpleader did not lie
because the plaintiff insurers were under an independent liability to it on two grounds. First, that under the letter of
Supreme's attorney to the attorneys for the insurers, confirming the Supreme settlement "on the same terms and conditions" as the settlement of the Atlantis action, Atlantis was
entitled to be paid the amount due under the settlement.
Second, Atlantis claimed an oral agreement made with plaintiffs at the time of the Supreme settlement to pay the amount
179 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
136Id. at 86.
135
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due under the settlement to it. The affidavits submitted on
the motion raised issues of fact which the court held could not
be determined on the papers submitted and placed the matter
of independent liability on the calendar for a preliminary
trial, thus following its decision in the America.-Hawaiian
S.S. Co. case. 13 7 The court held:
If, upon the preliminary trial [i.e., the first stage], the claim of
independent liability made by Atlantis is found to be without merit,
then the complaint in interpleader will be sustained and the plaintiffs
may be discharged from further liability on just terms. However,
should Atlantis establish its claim of independent liability the complaint in interpleader would be dismissed, at least as to it, Atlantis
would be entitled to maintain an action against plaintiffs based on
the independent liability, and plaintiffs would be left to such action
as might be appropriate with respect to their interpleader claims
against the remaining defendants.
Montgomlwry Ward & Co. v. Fidelity& Deposit Co. of Maryland,
7 Cir., 162 F.2d 264, which plaintiff urges leads to a different conclusion, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. Here, in contrast to Montgomery Ward, the interpleading plaintiffs, prior to the
settlement of the Supreme action in the state court on which the
claim of independent liability is founded, admittedly knew of the
existence of the claims of various creditors of Supreme who are
named as defendants in the interpleader action. Yet, if Atlantis is
to be believed, despite such knowledge plaintiff insurers expressly
promised to pay the amount due by way of settlement to Atlantis,
the mortgagee of the vessel, and thus created an absolute and independent liability to Atlantis quite apart from any liability which they
might have to the other defendants. It may well be that at the preliminary trial it will be found that no such promise was made by
the plaintiffs, and that all their liabilities arising out of these transactions were discharged by the payment of the amount due under the
Supreme settlement into the Registry of this court. But this is
dependent upon the result of the preliminary trial after proof as to
the facts and circumstances surrounding the Supreme settlement and
the dealings between the plaintiffs and Atlantis with respect thereto.
Accordingly the case will be placed on the trial calendar for a
preliminary trial of the issue of independent liability running from
2 American-Hawaiian S.S. Co. v. Bowring & Co., 150 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.

N.Y. 1957).
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plaintiffs to Atlantis. The temporary restraining order will continue
in force and effect until this issue is decided and such further order
38
as may be appropriate can then be made.'

The court's approach in both cases, it is submitted, runs
counter not merely to the intended liberality of both the
Federal Interpleader Act and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 22, but also to the liberality of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 20, permitting general joinder in one
action and providing for separate trials and the making of
other orders to prevent delay or prejudice. Here, the suggestion that the "determination of an independent liability
should be made [not at the first stage of interpleader but]
during the second stage of interpleader when the claimants
are contesting their theories of title" -39 seems appropriate.
"In an expanded second stage independent claimants would
present alternate grounds for recovery-title and independent
liability." 140 Perhaps the best solution is to clarify both
section 1335 and rule 22 as has been done recently in the
State of New York, where the New York Civil Practice Act
now provides: "Where the issue of an independent liability
of the stakeholder to a claimant is raised by the pleadings
or upon motion, the court may dismiss the cause of action
against the appropriate claimant, order a severance of the
action or separate trials, or require the litigation of the issue
in the action." 14THE CIVIL INTERPLEADER RULE 22

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 22, provides:
(1) Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined
as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such
that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability.
Poland v. Atlantis Credit Corp., 179 F. Supp. 863, 867-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
itterpleader in the
Federal Courts, 65 YALE L.J. 715, 720-21 (1956).
But see Developments in the Lav.-Multiparty Litigation in
140 Id. at 721.
the Federal Court, 71 HAv. L. Rnv. 874, 890 (1958).
See 1954 N.Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL ANN.
141 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 285(6).
REP. 276-77; Heene v. Sewell, 19 Misc.2d 118, 189 N.Y.S2d 924 (Sup. Ct
1959). See also PA. R. Civ. PRoc. 2301-25 (interpleader by defendants).
138

139 Note, The Independent Liability Rule as a Bar to
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It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the claims of the
several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend do not
have a common origin or are not identical but are adverse to and
independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that he is not
liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant
exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of
cross-claim or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule supplement
and do not in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in
Rule 20.
(2) The remedy herein provided is in addition to and in no
way supersedes or limits the remedy provided by Title 28 U.S.C.,
§§ 1335, 1397, and 2361. Actions under those provisions shall be
conducted in accordance with these rules.
Under paragraph (1) of this rule there is embraced the
general equity interpleader, the historical basis and general
principles of which have been discussed above. 1 42
Also,
"the first paragraph provides for interpleader relief along
the newer and more liberal lines of joinder in the alternative.
It avoids the confusion and restrictions that developed
around actions of strict interpleader and actions in the nature
of interpleader. Compare John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Kegan et al., D.C. Md. 1938, 22 F. Supp. 326.
It does not change the rules on service of process, jurisdiction, and venue, as established by judicial decisions." 143
Paragraph (2) expressly preserves statutory interpleader
which has also been previously considered, 1 44 and provides
that the procedure under statutory interpleader must be in
accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. "The
second paragraph allows an action to be brought under the
recent interpleader statute when applicable. By this paragraph all remedies under the statute are continued, but the
manner of obtaining them is in accordance with these

rules."

145

142 See text accompanying notes 10-18 supra.
'43 FED. R. Civ. P. 22, notes of Advisory Committee, p. 239.
14 See text accompanying notes 120-24 supra.

145 Supra note 143.
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INTERPLEADER UNDER RULE 22(1) AND UNDER STATUTORY
INTERPLEADER COMPARED

A comparison and contrast of statutory and so-called
equity interpleader as amplified by rule 22(1) may be
helpful:
(1) Diversity of Citizenship and JurisdictionalAmount:
Under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1335 (statutory interpleader), as previously shown," 6 the required diversity of
citizenship as defined in and presently construed under that
section is that at least some of the claimants are citizens of
different states, the citizenship of the plaintiff stakeholder,
147
to the extent that he is disinterested, being disregarded.
Under those circumstances the jurisdictional minimum is
$500. If, however, diversity of citizenship between claimants
is lacking, statutory interpleader will not lie and we must
look to rule 22(1). Under this rule there must be complete
diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff stakeholder on
the one side and the claimants on the other side under the
judicial construction of Stralwbridge v. Curtiss.148 In other
words, if this is the jurisdictional foundation, section 1332
of title 28, the general diversity of citizenship statute,
controls. Hence the jurisdictional minimum of in excess of
$10,000 exclusive of interest and costs is also required.' 4 9
In Hunter v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 150 the Eighth Circuit
sustained the jurisdiction of the federal court to entertain
an interpleader action where the claimants were all citizens
of Arkansas and the stakeholder was a citizen of Illinois, the
matter in controversy being in excess of the jurisdictional
minimum. The court said:
While the question of federal jurisdiction under such circumstances
• . . will not be finally put to rest until decided by the Supreme
146 See text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
147 Ibid.
148 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
149 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
150 111 F.2d 551 (8th Cir. 1940).
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Court of the United States (see Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
308 U.S. 66, 73, 60 S. Ct. 44, 84 L. ed. -),151 we think that the
right of a stakeholder to be relieved of vexation, the danger of
multiple liability, and the responsibility of undertaking to decide, at
his peril, which of two or more adverse claimants is entitled to money
or property in his hands, has the effect of making him a real party
in interest. 15 2
However, under rule 22(1) there seems to be no reason

why jurisdiction in a proper case may not be invoked on the
basis of a federal question. 5 3
(2) .Process:

As would be logically expected, process of the district
court in equitable interpleader as expanded by rule 22(1)
is, as in the usual diversity of citizenship case, governed by
rule 4(f): the summons may be served only "within the
territorial limits of the state in which the district court is
held ...." This conclusion is based on the Supreme Court
decision in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dun.levy,' 4 holding

that interpleader is not an in rem proceeding, and that a
binding judgment cannot be rendered against anyone over
whom personal jurisdiction cannot be acquired. Section
1655 of title 28, however, has been invoked in a few situations. This section, to the extent pertinent, provides that:
"In an action in a district court to enforce any lien upon or
151

This case is discussed in note 50

.supra.

152 Hunter v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 111 F.2d 551, 555 (8th Cir. 1940).

Obviously no reference was made by the court to rule 22(1) since the action
had been commenced on October 23, 1935, almost 3 years before the effective
date of the Federal Civil Rules. See also Kerrigan's Estate v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 199 F.2d 694, 696-97 (3d Cir. 1952); United States
v. Sentinel Fire Ins. Co., 178 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1949); Rossetti v. Hill,
162 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1947) ; Security Trust & Say. Bank v. Walsh, 91 F.2d
481, 483 (9th Cir. 1937) ; Consolidated Underwriters v. Bradshaw, 136 F. Supp.
305 (W.D. Ark. 1955); E. C. Robinson Lumber Co. v. Fort, 112 F. Supp.
242 (E.D. Mo. 1953) ; Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. City of St. Louis,
109 F. Supp. 137 (E.D. Mo. 1952); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Wilson, 105
F. Supp. 454, 456 (E.D.S.C. 1952).
13 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958). See Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank &
Union Trust Co., 209 F.2d 467, 473-74 (9th Cir. 1953). See also Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co. v. Industrial Union, 95 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Pa.
1950).
154241 U.S. 518 (1916).
See also Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326,
130 N.E. 566 (1921).
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claim to, or to remove any incumbrance or lien or cloud upon
the title to, real or personal property within the district,
where any defendant cannot be served within the State, or
does not voluntarily appear, the court may order the absent
defendant to appear or plead by a day certain." 155
A case where this section was relied upon is A/S Krediit
Pank 'v. Chase Manhattan Bank.15 6 Krediit was an alien
banking corporation organized under the laws of Estonia,
a country occupied by Soviet Russia in 1940. This occupation existed except for the period of 1941-1944 when the
country was occupied by the Germans. The United States
has never recognized the occupation of Estonia. Prior to
the occupation, Krediit had its domicile and head office in
Tallinn, Estonia. At the time of the occupation, Krediit had
on deposit to its account in New York with the then Chase
National Bank, now the Chase )anhattan Bank, a New York
corporation, the sum of $123,000. It had been a depositor
in Chase since 1935. When Estonia was occupied, these
funds were blocked by Executive Order. For some years
prior to 1940, Krediit had furnished Chase with circulars
containing specimen signatures of the persons authorized to
draw on behalf of Krediit. Two of these persons who were
so authorized at the time of the occupation were A and B,
both of whom escaped from Estonia and went to Sweden
after the occupation. On December 10, 1940, five months
after the Soviet occupation, Chase received a so-called
"tested" cable from Tallinn, signed "A/S Krediit Pank,"
155 The balance of this section follows: "Such order shall be served on the
absent defendant personally if practicable, wherever found, and also upon the
person or persons in possession or charge of such property, if any. Where
personal service is not practicable, the order shall be published as the court
may direct, not less than once a week for six consecutive weeks.
"If an absent defendant does not appear or plead within the time allowed,
the court may proceed as if the absent defendant had been served with process
within the State, but any adjudication shall, as regards the absent defendant
without appearance, affect only the property which is the subject of the action.
When a part of the property is within another district, but within the same
state such action may be brought in either district.
"Any defendant not so personally notified may, at any time within one
year after final judgment, enter his appearance, and thereupon the court shall
set aside the judgment and permit such defendant to plead on payment of
such costs as the court claims just." 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1958).
I.+ 155 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y, 1957),
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directing it to close the Xrediit account and place the balance
to the account of Gosbank, the cable address for the State
Bank of the U.S.S.R. in Moscow, and to advise Krediit and
the so-called "beneficiary" when this had been done. 157 Chase
applied to the Treasury Department for a license permitting
it to dispose of the Krediit account in compliance with the
tested cable but no such license was ever issued. Thereafter,
A and B wrote to Chase from Sweden that an extraordinary
meeting of the shareholders of Krediit had been held in
Stockholm, Sweden, at which meeting the domicile of Krediit
was moved to Stockholm, the authority of A and B confirmed
to sign for Krediit, and a power of attorney granted to A
and B to act on iKrediit's behalf. They also wrote that a
second meeting of the shareholders was held in 1950 at the
Estonian Consulate in New York City, where the authority
of A and B to act was again confirmed, and requested Chase
to apply to the Treasury Department to unblock the account.
Chase replied, setting forth all the circumstances, and stated
that it could not make payment if the account should be
unblocked, without a prior judicial determination.
Krediit then brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York for a declaratory judgment that A and B were the only authorized agents
of Krediit in the United States, and entitled to dispose of
the funds on deposit "in whatever manner that they deem
proper in promotion of the interests" of Krediit once the
government had unblocked the funds. In its answer, Chase
set up a counterclaim by way of defensive interpleader,
averring that it held no interest in the funds (now consisting
of .5115,000 in United States Treasury bills and a credit balance of $12,581.65) except for costs, expenses and attorneys'
fees. It set up in detail the facts of the adverse claims made
upon it, and asked that A,, B, John Doe and Richard Roe,
as allegedly authorized representatives of Krediit who directed the sending of the tested cable and the State Bank of
the U.S.S.R., be made parties to the action to respond to the

137 A "tested" cable is a cable sent in a private code of the sender (in this
case Krediit) of which Chase had a copy.
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complaint and the counterclaim, and interplead their respective claims. Chase also asked that the court adjudge which
of the parties was authorized to act on behalf of Krediit.
Service by publication on these defendants was sought pursuant to section 1655. The district court held:
The securities now held by Chase for this account plainly constitute
personal property within the district 358 to which a claim has been
asserted. None of the interpleaded defendants are within the State
of New York. Chase appears to be entitled to an order directing
the absent defendants to appear and plead under Section 1655.
But it does not necessarily follow from this that Chase is entitled to serve all of these parties by publication. Section 1655 151
provides that the order requiring absent defendants to appear or
plead "shall be served on the absent defendant personally, if practicable, wherever found." Only "where personal service is not
practicable" is service of the order by publication authorized ....
In my view Chase has not shown that personal service on . . .
[the named parties], is not practical within the meaning of the statute.
It is true that they are not within this State and probably not within
the country. But the whole procedure provided by the Section is
predicated on the absence of the defendants to be served from the
jurisdiction, and a mere absence in itself is not sufficient to show
that personal service is impractical. Under the scheme of this statute,
expressly authorizing service on defendants "wherever found," there
appears to be no reason why the order should not be served on the
named defendants to be interpleaded in the places where they reside
or can be found. These places must be known to or are easily discoverable by Chase. The provision . . . [of the section] permitting
final judgment to be set aside within a year if service is made by
publication rather than personally emphasizes the necessity for making a strong showing that it is not practical to serve the defendants
personally. Thus, the order to be entered here should provide for
personal service on all the interpleaded defendants with the exception
of John Doe and Richard Roe, who may be served by publication.
This is, of course, without prejudice to a further application by Chase
for leave to serve by publication in the event that any of the defendants cannot be found.1 10
158 See text of § 1655 accompanying note 155 supra, providing, inter alia, for
venue in this tyne of action.
159

160

See note 155 ,rupra.

A/S Krediit Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 155 F. Supp. 30, 36-37
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In Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Du Roure,16 1 there were four
actions, each brought by a different insurance company to
interplead the claimants to the insurance proceeds of certain
annuity policies issued to one Patenotre, a citizen of France,
since deceased. These interpleader actions were commenced
and the insurance proceeds paid into the registry of the court
about two and a quarter years after the death of the insured.
The real issue was whether plaintiffs were justified in waiting
that long period before instituting interpleader. 16 2 Plaintiffs
contended that they were unable to obtain jurisdiction over
all the claimants in a single action, since at least one of the
necessary parties was beyond the reach of process until July
1953. Defendants contended that there was no reason for
delay because, once the fund was deposited in court, the interpleader would become an in rem proceeding in which the
insurance companies could have obtained their discharges
against all the world. The court disagreed with this contention, feeling bound by the Supreme Court decision in New
York Life Ins.Co. v. Dunlevy 163 which held that interpleader
is not an in rem proceeding and that a binding judgment
cannot be rendered against any one over whom personal jurisdiction cannot be acquired. The Republic of China v. American Empress Co. decisions,1 6 4 the court said, "perhaps look
the other way but that case involved a bank account which,
in deference to the popular conception, is often treated by

(S.D.N.Y. 1957). The case relied on by the court is Republic of China v.
American Express Co., 95 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d 230
(2d Cir. 1952), remanded, 108 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). This case also
involved a defensive interpleader; the matter in dispute was a bank account
and not securities as in the Krediit case. It is rather difficult to bring such a
bank account within the provisions of § 1655. The court, however, held it
to be a "special fund" which the defendant was ready and willing to pay into
court, if it be required, thus, in effect, turning an in personam suit into an
in rem proceeding.
161 123 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
162 Defendants contended that by failing to take prompt action plaintiffs
(1) wrongfully withheld payment of the insurance proceeds and subjected
themselves to liability for wrongful detention of the funds, and forfeited the
usual allowance of lawyers' fees accorded to totally disinterested involuntary
stakeholders, or (2) were unjustly enriched.
123241 U.S. 518 (1916). See also Hanna v. Stedman, supra note 154.
264Supra note 160.
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the law as 'money in the bank' rather than a mere chose in
action." 165
It is interesting to note how New York State, also faced
with the Supreme Court decision in Dwnalevy 166 and its own
Court of Appeals decision in Hanna. v. Stednvn,"67 has attempted to turn an in personam claim for a sum of money
owing by the stakeholder into a claim against a res. Section
286(2) of the New York Civil Practice Act provides:
Where a stakeholder is otherwise entitled to proceed under section
two hundred eighty-five for the determination of a right to, interest
in or lien upon a sum of money, whether or not liquidated in amount,
payable in the state under or on account of a contract, express or
implied, or claimed as damages for the alleged unlawful retention
of specific real or personal property within the state, and the stakeholder is a natural person having a permanent residence or an established place of business in the state or a firm or corporation conducting
business in the state and subject to the service of process, he may
apply to the court either before action or at any time during the
pendency of an action commenced against such stakeholder, upon
good cause shown, for an order permitting him to deliver or pay
into the court or to a person designated by the court or to retain
to the credit of the action said sum of money or part thereof to be
disposed of in accordance with further order or final judgment. The
court shall make such order upon satisfactory proof by affidavit or
otherwise of the facts alleged in the stakeholder's application regarding stakeholder's compliance with the requirements of this subdivision.
Upon compliance with the order of the court, such sum of money
shall be deemed to be property within the state for the purpose of this
68
subdivision and subdivision four of section two hundred thirty-two.'
Section 232 of the Civil Practice Act, specifying the actions in which an order for service by publication may be
made, was simultaneously amended by adding subdivision 4
which provides that such order may be granted: "Where an
order has been granted pursuant to subdivision two of section

165
166

167
168

Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Du Roure, 123 F. Supp. 736, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
230 N.Y. 326, 130 N.E. 566 (1921).
N.Y. Civ. PRec. AcT § 286(2).
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two hundred eighty-six, and a cause of action described
therein is alleged in the pleading." 169
These sections cover both offensive and defensive interpleader. It still remains to be seen how the courts will
treat this revision in view of the constitutional question
involved.' 70
Statutory interpleader, on the other hand, is governed
by section 2361 of title 28, which provides that in any civil
action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader brought
under section 1335, "a district court may issue its process for
all claimants and enter its order restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or
United States court affecting the property, instrument or
obligation involved in the interpleader action . . . . Such
process ... shall be addressed to and served by the United

States marshals for the respective districts where the claimants reside or may be found."
Thus, in Hagam 'v. Central Ave. Dairy, Inc., a stakeholder brought a statutory interpleader suit in a District
Court in California against one claimant, a citizen of
California, and another, a citizen of Arizona. The District
Court had jurisdiction of the Arizona citizen served in
Arizona in connection with the adjudication of their claims,
if any, to the fund deposited in court. 171 In this connection,
the question has arisen whether such jurisdiction extends
beyond that fund or property.
(a) Cross-ClaimsBetween Claimants.-FederalRules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 13 (g), provides that "a pleading may
state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a coparty arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject
matter of the original action."

169

170
171

N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 232(4).
See Legislation, 19 ALBANY L. REv. 145, 148-51 (1955).
180 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1950).
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(b) Gross-Claims Under Title 28 U.S.C., Section 1335.In the Hagan 17 2 case, discussed above, it further appeared
that the Arizona defendant had made no appearance or answer, and so the escrow deposit was awarded to the California
defendant. In the meantime, the California defendant had
filed a cross-claim for money damages growing out of the
same contract as the escrow deposit. The Arizona defendant
then appeared specially and objected to the court's jurisdiction over it in respect of the cross-claim, which objection was
sustained and the cross-claim dismissed. On appeal the
Court of Appeals affirmed, stating:
We think the District Court of California did not have personal
jurisdiction over the absent non-consenting Arizona corporation except to the extent of that corporation's interest in the escrow fund.
That the court had jurisdiction that far is clear from the statute.
Furthermore, if Congress had so provided, we think there is no
reason why process from the United States District Court could not
run country-wide. But Congress has not so provided, generally, and
a District Court's power to hear and decide cases involving personal
liability of an individual is limited to those served within the state
where the court sits. The absentee defendant was not personally
before the court here. The court could adjudicate rights in the fund,
but could affect no other interest of the absentee.
It would be a startling conclusion, we think, to give Rule 13 (g)
and the Interpleader statute the effect of enlarging the jurisdiction of
a court to create rights going beyond those to the fund which is the
subject of the interpleader action. Such a construction would go
far beyond the situation which called for the Interpleader statute in
173
the first place.
Apparently concurring in the views expressed in the
Hagan case is Coastal Air Lines, Inc. v. Dockery,'7 4 decided
by the Eighth Circuit. There, an insurer of an aircraft, a
Pennsylvania corporation, brought statutory interpleader in
the federal court in Arkansas against the owner and the
lessee of an airplane which had crashed while in the posses-

172

Jyid.

at 503. See 29 N.C.L. Rlv. 68 (1950). See also Great Lakes Auto
Ins. Group v. Shepherd, 95 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Ark. 1951).
174 180 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1950).
173Id.
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sion of the lessee. Both the owner, a citizen of Arkansas,
and the lessee, a Pennsylvania corporation, appeared and
claimed the insurance. The lessee asserted that it had purchased the aircraft through the exercise of an option which
had been in the lease. The owner cross-claimed against the

lessee for rent under the lease contract, alleging refusal of
the lessee to purchase. At the trial, the adverse claimants stipulated that the sole questions for decision were:

(1) whether the lessee had exercised its purchase option;
and (2) whether the lessee was indebted to the lessor for
unpaid rent. On appeal from a judgment in favor of the
owner on his cross-claim for rent, the lessee contended,

inter alia, that the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the cross-claim by one interpleaded party against
another, but was limited to a disposition of the fund in court.
In affirming the lower court judgment, the Court of Appeals

held that here, contrary to the jurisdictional facts in the
Hagan case, the lessee appellant had appeared in the inter-

pleader action in the federal District Court to assert its
claim to the fund in the court registry, had interposed no
objection to the jurisdiction of the court on the cross-claim,
and in fact had stipulated that the question presented by
the cross-claim was before the court for decision. Accordingly, the lessee had "waived any objection it might have
raised to the venue of the action on the cross-claim or to the
personal jurisdiction of the Arkansas federal court over
it." 175

175 Coastal Air Lines, Inc. v. Dockery, 180 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1950).
The
court also held that there was no question but that the cross-claim came within
the terms of rule 13(g), and stated: "The rights of the parties to the action
on the cross-claim were controlled by State law, but questions of jurisdiction
and procedure of the Federal Court are determined by Federal law. The sum
involved in the cross-claim was less than the required jurisdictional sum required in a diversity case. Rule 13(g) neither extends nor limits the jurisdiction of the Federal Court nor the venue of actions therein, Rule 82,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but cross-claims permitted by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are regarded as ancillary to the principal claim to
which they are related and need not involve the jurisdictional sum necessary
in an original or independent action in the District Court." Id. at 877. See

Moseley v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 164 (W.D. Mo. 1952), where
the court said: "In the case of Coastal Air Lines v. Dockery . . . the Court
of Appeals, this Circuit, strongly intimated that the courts would have no
jurisdiction save in those cases where the nonresident parties waive venue

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 35

(c) Cross-Claims Under Rule 22(1).-Since rule 22(1)
is governed for jurisdictional purposes by section 1332 of
title 28, cross-claims asserted by adverse claimants who have
been served with process within the court's jurisdiction
should not present serious problems if such cross-claims arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the main suit.
[W]here the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action,
the defendants submitting themselves to the court thereby confer upon
it jurisdiction over their persons. And such parties may likewise by
cross-complaint submit ancillary suits to the court, and the court will
entertain the ancillary suits although it could not have entertained
1 6
them as independent suits. 7

(3)

Tenue Under Statutory Interpleader:

Here the governing section is section 1397 of title 28,
which provides that "any civil-action of interpleader or in
the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this title
may be brought in the judicial district in which one or more
of the claimants reside."
The earlier statutes, those of 1917 and of 1926,177 had
been rather complicated in dealing with venue, with proviso
superimposed on proviso, and difficulties had accordingly
arisen. ' s These have been removed. Under the present act,
while venue may be waived by consent of the parties, the
objection is valid if it is timely, and the action will be
17 9
dismissed.

in cases such as the one at bar. An identical ruling was made by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Hagan v. Central Avenue Dairy, Inc. .. ."
Id. at 165. Consider also a somewhat similar question discussed in Consolidated Underwriters v. Bradshaw, 136 F. Supp. 395, 397-98 (W.D. Ark. 1955).
See also Annot., Federal Interpleader-CrossClaim, 17 A.L.R.2d 741 (1951)
Mayer v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 165 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
176 Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Wilson, 105 F. Supp. 454, 457 (E.D.S.C. 1952).
Cf. Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955).
177 Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929; Act of May 8, 1926, ch. 273,

44 Stat. 416.
178 See Bankers' Life Co. v. Ebbert, 48 F.2d 907 (W.D. Pa. 1928); New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 253 Fed. 287 (S.D. Fla. 1918); Penn Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 244 Fed. 877 (N.D. Fla. 1917).
179 Moseley v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., supra note 175.
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A question arises when a claimant is a corporation.
Where does it "reside" for venue purposes under section 1397
which may be termed a special venue provision? The
Supreme Court held many years ago that a corporation is
a "resident" only of the state in which it was incorporated
and of the district in that state in which its principal office
was located.18 0 Section 1391 of title 28, the general venue
section, in subsection (c), however, provides that "a corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business,
and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence
of such corporation for venue purposes." This section should
supplement section 1397 although the Supreme Court's de8
cision in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp.,' 1
construing the unique patent infringement section 1400 (b),"s2
held:
We think it is clear that § 1391(c) is a general corporation venue
statute, whereas § 1400(b) is a special venue statute applicable,
specifically, to all defendants in a particular type of action, i.e.,

patent infringement actions.

In these circumstances the law is set-

tled that "However inclusive may be the general language of a

statute, it 'will not be held to apply to a matter specifically dealt
with in another part of the same enactment.... ,,18
Surely section 1397 does present the special reasons which
prompted the enactment of section 1400(b) and its predecessor statute. 8 4 The primary purpose of the interpleader
provisions is to help the stakeholder in avoiding double liability and vexatious actions.

1 0

8 Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444 (1892), reaffirmed in Fourco
Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
181 Supra note 180.
18228 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1958) reads as follows:
"Any civil action for
patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement
and has a regular and established place of business."
183 Fourco Glass. Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., supra note 180, at 228.
184 See text accompanying notes 177-79 supra.
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(4) Venue Under Rule 22(1):
Section 1391 of title 28, the general venue section,
controls:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on
diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district
where all defendants reside, except as otherwise provided by law.
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it
is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and
such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such
corporation for venue purposes.
(d) An alien may be sued in any district.
This subject obviously requires consideration of so many
problems particularly in multi-party suits that it cannot be
considered in this article on interpleader.
(5)

Deposit in Court Registry Under Statutory
Interpleader:

Since the Interpleader Act of 1926,185 statutory interpleader has required payment into the court registry; the
act of 1936 "6 added the provision for substitution of a bond.
The present act requires as a condition to jurisdiction that
the plaintiff has deposited such money or property or has paid the
amount of or the loan or other value of such instrument or the
amount due under such obligation into the registry of the court, there
to abide the judgment of the court, or has given bond payable to the
clerk of the court in such amount and with such surety as the court
or judge may deem proper, conditioned upon the compliance by the
plaintiff with the future order or judgment of the court with respect
to the subject matter of the controversy.' 8 7

185 Act of May 8, 1926, ch. 273. 44 Stat. 416.
18 Act of Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, 49 Stat 1096.

18728 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (2) (1958).
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In Ednter v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co, '1 88 the
stakeholder insurance company had brought defensive interpleader under the act of 1936 189 against the trustee in bankruptcy of one Lum, the insured under three life insurance
policies of the face value of M42,500, and against the estate
of one Mathews. Lum, prior to bankruptcy, had lodged with
the insurance company collateral assignments of the policies
to Mathews purporting to be given as security for indebtedness. Thereafter Mathews notified it, claiming to be the
absolute owner of the policies under an agreement of purchase and sale made with Lum five days before the collateral
assignments were executed. Mathews subsequently died, and
his estate in the interpleader wanted to keep the policies in
force for their full face value. Lum's trustee in bankruptcy,
claiming that Lum's indebtedness had been satisfied out of
other property, asserted the right to the full cash surrender
value of the policies. The insurance company deposited in
the registry of the court the cash surrender value of the
policies amounting to 18,972.50. One of the questions raised
was whether this deposit complied with the statute. In answering in the negative, the Third Circuit said:
In the present case the amount deposited was $18,972.50, the
cash surrender value of the policies. This, however, is not the amount
with respect to which the controversy between these parties exists.
While it is the amount claimed by the trustee, who desires to cancel
the policies and receive their present value, it is not the amount
claimed by the executrix, who does not want any cash now but does
want to keep the policies in force for their full face value of $42,500.
No one here questions the right of the trustee to receive the cash
surrender value if he is able to establish his title to the policies....

The award of title to either party will carry with it the incidental
either to surrender the policies and receive
rights of ownership ....
their present value or to retain them in force for future benefits.
It may be suggested that the Company should have deposited
$42,500, the face amount of the policies. However, neither party
to the controversy is presently entitled to that sum or claims it. By
the deposit of that sum the Company could not relieve itself of future

188
189

138 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1943).
Act of Jan. 20, 1936, 49 Stat. 1096.
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liability under the policies if the owner for any reason desired to
keep them in force. The impracticability of any deposit by the insurance company under the circumstances of this case was recognized
in the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary from which
we have already quoted. As we have seen, the Committee pointed
out that the bill proposed to grant to a plaintiff in interpleader the
right to file a bond instead of making a deposit and that this was
done, inter alia, for the purpose of providing a practicable procedure
for the type of case which we are now considering. Under the statute
the bond is conditioned upon "the compliance by the complainant
with the future order or decree of the court with respect to the
subject matter of the controversy." The bond thus will secure performance by the insurance company of a decree that the successful
party in the interpleader be recognized as the owner of the policies
and, therefore, entitled, free of all claims by the unsuccessful party,
to all the rights and benefits conferred by the policies ...
In the present case . . . the Company did not file a bond but
instead deposited the cash surrender value of the policies. We hold
that under the circumstances disclosed in this case this was not a
sufficient compliance with the statute....
The making of the deposit or giving of a bond is . . . made a
condition precedent to the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction to
direct the extra territorial service of process upon a nonresident defendant and to take further steps in the cause. Since in the present
case a deposit was inappropriate and a bond was not filed the court
was without jurisdiction to grant the preliminary injunction appealed
from.190
A similar contention in respect of specific property was
presented in Austin v. Texas-Ohio Gas Co.19' The Fifth
Circuit there stated
that the plaintiff seeks a determination of rights in 95,000 shares
190 Edner v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 F.2d 327, 329-30 (3d
Cir. 1943). See Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Baker, 105 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.
1939); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kegan, 22 F. Supp. 326, 328
(D. Md. 1938). Cf. United States v. Sentinel Fire Ins. Co., 178 F.2d 217
(5th Cir. 1949). The court in the Edner case also held that the district
courts are authorized under statutory interpleader to take jurisdiction of a
suit involving a life insurance policy where one of the claimants does not
claim any present sum or benefit under the policy but merely asserts his
right to the possession of the policy as owner, and to claim in the future
such benefits under the policy as it may afford to him and as he may elect
to claim.
191218 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
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but tendered into court only the 23,700 shares still within its possession. There are at least two answers to appellants' contention. In
the first place, the plaintiff had some control as to the untendered
balance of 71,300 shares. Having issued these to certain defendants
in trust for certain purposes under the settlement with Austin, it
no longer had a possessory or proprietary interest in them, but nevertheless did have the power to refuse to transfer the certificates on its
books if such transfers were not in accordance with the purpose for
which they were given, or were in violation of the trust. Plaintiff
declared in its complaint that it would not make any transfers except
on the order of the court and it specifically tendered "such right or
control" which it had over the remaining shares.
In the second place, this case can be viewed as an action in the
nature of interpleader concerning these 23,700 shares, in which it is
alleged that each of the defendants has some claim. It seems the
only natural construction, in fact, of 28 U.S.C.§ 1335 (a) (2) that
this is the "property" which it is necessary to deposit in court, in a
case such as this involving specific property and not simply a claim
for money. The applicable words of the statute are: "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by any person, firm, or
corporation, association, or society having in his or its custody or
possession . . . property of the value of $500 or more .. .if .. .
the plaintiff has deposited such .. .property .. .into the registry
of the court . . . ." The words "such property" logically refer to
property in plaintiff's custody or possession; it follows that the
statute does not require a plaintiff, in order to obtain jurisdiction,
to perform the impossible condition of depositing into court specific
property which he does not have in his possession, provided of course
that he can and does deposit money or specific property in his possession of the value of $500 or more, and which is the subject of conflicting claims of the defendants.' 9 2 Nor does it deprive the court
192"That this correctly states the statutory requirement is supported by
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 60 S. Ct. 44, 47, 84 L. Ed. 85.
Although the Supreme Court did not discuss the adequacy of the deposit made
in that case to confer jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, it necessarily
held that the deposit was sufficient, in affirming the Court of Appeals' decision.
In that opinion of the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, 99 F.2d 651, at
page 653, it appears that the plaintiff was not in possession or custody of
the shares of stock claimed by defendants, and tendered only the accrued
dividends on those shares at the time it commenced the action. The stock
certificates were later deposited into court during the pendency of the action,
evidently by the several defendants. Thus the case seems clear authority that
a plaintiff is not required in an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, to deposit
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of its statutory jurisdiction, perfected by the deposit of this property
into court, for the plaintiff to allege that the 23,700 shares are part
of a larger block of 95,000, and that the total rights of the several
parties cannot finally be determined unless the court incidentally
considers the interests of the various defendants in the larger block
of stock. There is nothing inconsistent with this rationale in the
cases holding that a condition precedent to jurisdiction under the
statute is absent when plaintiff deposits a sum of money smaller
than that which is in fact claimed by some of the claimants; because
the words of the statute applicable in those cases say that the district court will have jurisdiction when the plaintiff has ".

.

. issued

a note, bond, certificate, policy of insurance, or other instrument of
value or amount of $500 or more, or providing for the delivery or
payment or the loan of money.., of such amount or value, or [is]
under any obligation written or unwritten to the amount of $500
or more, if . . . the plaintiff has . . .paid the amount of or the loan
or other 'value of such instrument or the amount due under such
obligation into the registry of the court . . . ." Obviously this re-

quirement is quite different. Where claims for a sum of money only
are involved, payment of the entire sum (or giving of a bond) is a
condition precedent to the court's jurisdiction. But when claims for
specific property are involved the statute imposes the condition of
depositing only the specific property in plaintiff's possession, and the
further condition that such property be of the value of $500 or
193
more.
(6) Deposit in Court Registry Under Rule 22(1):
Although there is no express provision in rule 22(1)

1 4
9

for deposit or offer of deposit in the court registry, there are
cases under rule 22(1) where the stakeholder has followed
the equity principle of depositing the sum in the registry to
specific chattels not in his possession or custody (or a bond in lieu thereof)
as a condition to commencing the action, provided that he is able to comply
with the deposit requirement by tendering other money or property involved
in the dispute, and of the value of $500 or more." Austin v. Texas-Ohio
GasCo., 218 F.2d 739, 745 n.4 (5th Cir. 1955).
93
1 1d. at 744-45.
194The Official Forms 18 (Complaint for Interpleader and Declaratory
Relief) and 21 (Answer to Complaint Set Forth in Form 8, with Counterclaim for Interpleader) do not make any reference to a deposit in the court
registry. In fact, rule 22(1) and the forms indicate that the action contemplated is in the nature of a declaratory action.
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terminate his liability.195 Where, however, the stakeholder
is not completely disinterested and, therefore, stays in the
case, there is authority that the requirement of deposit into
court never existed, 196 and that "the necessity of a deposit
in the generality of cases may be a technicality carried over
from the common law, serving no function which could not
be served better by the flexible doctrine of 'clean hands' and

'doing equity-.'"7 197

(7) Injunctive Relief Under Statutory Interpleader:
The Interpleader Act of 1926

19s

amended the 1917 Inter-

pleader Act 11"to provide as follows: "Notwithstanding any
provision of the Judicial Code to the contrary, said [district]
court shall have power to issue its process for all claimants
and to issue an order of injunction against each of them,

enjoining them from instituting or prosecuting any suit or
proceeding in any State court or in any other Federal
court .... ,,200 The Supreme Court has held that the provisions of former Section 265 of the Judicial Code 2 0 1 -a
limitation of the power of the federal courts to prevent needless friction between state and federal courts-was not applicable.20 2 The Interpleader Act of 1936 203 contained a
similar provision, and with reference thereto, the Supreme
Court held:
'19 See Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Dinoff, 72 F. Supp. 723, 725 (D. Kan.
1947); Helis v. Vallee, 34 F. Supp. 467, 470 (E.D. La. 1940). See also
Jersey Ins. Co. v. Altieri, 5 N.J. Super. 577, -, 68 A.2d 852, 853 (Ch. 1949).
See rule 67 providing for deposit in court generally, and Bank of China v.
Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 209 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1953).
1r Dor v. Fox, 61 N.Y. 264 (1874); Mohawk & Hudson R.
v. Clute,
4 Paige 384 (N.Y. Cb. 1834); Frumer, On Revising the New York Inter-

pleader Statates,25 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 737, 770 (1950) ;
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339-40 (1901).
197 Austin v. Texas-Ohio Gas Co., supra note 192, at 746 n.7.
10S Act of May 8, 1926, ch. 273, 44 Stat. 416.
2199
0 0 Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929.
Act of May 8, 1926, ch. 273, 44 Stat. 416.
201 "The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United
States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such
injunction may be authorized by any liw relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."
Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 321, § 266, 36 Stat. 1162.
202 Dugas v. American Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 414, 428-29 (1937) (Interpleader
Act of 1926).
203 Act of Jan. 20, 1936, 49 Stat. 1096.
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That section [265] forbids a United States court from staying proceedings in any state court. The Interpleader Act, passed subsequently, however, authorizes the enjoining of parties to the interpleader from further prosecuting any suit in any state or United
States court on account of the property involved. Such authority
is essential to the protection of the interpleader jurisdiction and is
a valid exercise of the judicial power. Section 265 is a mere limitation upon the general equity powers of the United States courts and
may be varied by Congress to meet the requirements of federal
20 4
litigation.
The injunction provisions of the 1936 act are now found,
with changes in phraseology, in section 2361 of the 1948

codification of title 28.205

Also, Federal Rules of Civil Pro-

cedure, Rule 65, which governs the issuance of injunctions
generally, specifically provides in subdivision (e) that these
rules "do not modify . .. the provisions of Title 28, U.S.C.
§ 2361, relating to the preliminary injunctions in actions of
interpleader or in the nature of interpleader." But it would
seem that rule 65 applies to the permanent injunction since

subdivision (e) only excepts the preliminary injunction.
The obvious should not be overlooked, namely, that an
injunction will only issue if the district court has jurisdiction of the interpleader under section 1335 of title 28. This
subject was considered above in connection with deposit in

court registry. 0

Thus, where the requisite deposit has not

been made or a bond furnished, an injunction will be

204 Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 74 (1939).
See also
Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 132-34 (1941).
205 The section reads as follows:
"In any civil action of interpleader or in
the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of this title, a district court may
issue its process for all claimants and enter its order restraining them from
instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United States court
affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved in the interpleader
action until further order of the court. Such process and order shall be
returnable at such time as the court or judge thereof directs, and shall be
addressed to and served by the United States marshals for the respective districts where the claimants reside or may be found.

"Such district court shall hear and determine the case, and may discharge
the plaintiff from further liability, make the injunction permanent, and make
all appropriate orders to enforce its judgment."
206 Text accompanying notes 186-97 srapra.
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denied. 20 7 Of course, the required diversity among claimants
and monetary minimum must be present.
(8) Injunctive Relief Under Civil Rule 22(1):
Section 2361 does not expressly apply to interpleader
under rule 22(1), since the section is limited by its terms to
"civil actions of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader
under section 1335 of this Title." 208 Accordingly, we must
look elsewhere for authority to grant temporary or permanent injunctions, since if interpleader is to be efficient, the
court must be given the power to enjoin suits or other proceedings by the various claimants. Although there should
be no lack of equity powers where such suits or proceedings
are solely in the federal courts, the so-called Anti-Injunction
Act209 presents problems where the suits or proceedings
sought to be enjoined are or may be in the state courts. This
statute, until the 1948 amendment of title 28, read as follows:
"The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of
the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State,
except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by
any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." 210 This
act was clearly applicable to interpleader under rule 22 (1) .211
In the 1948 codification of title 28, this act has become section 2283 and reads as follows: "A court of the United
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments." The reviser's note to
this section says that:
The exceptions specifically include the words "to protect or
effectuate its judgments," for lack of which the Supreme Court held
that the Federal courts are without power to enjoin relitigation of
207 Austin v. Texas-Ohio Gas Co., 218 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); Edner v.
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1943).
208 See statute cited note 205 sapra.
2028 U.S.C. §2283 (1958).
210Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 321, § 266, 36 Stat. 1162.
211 See General Exporting Co. v. Star Transfer Line, 136 F.2d 329 (6th
Cir. 1943).
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cases and controversies fully adjudicated by such courts. (See
Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 62 S. Ct. 139, 314 U.S.
118, 86 L. Ed. 100. A vigorous dissenting opinion ...notes that

at the time of the 1911 revision of the Judicial Code, the power of
the courts of the United States to protect their judgments was unquesioned and that the revisers of that code noted no change and
Congress intended no change).
Therefore the revised section restores the basic law as generally
understood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision.
It would seem to follow that, where a district court has
entered final judgment in an interpleader under rule 22(1),
it is also empowered to enjoin the claimants from taking
further proceedings in a state court inconsistent with its
judgment. What about the power of the district court to
grant a preliminary injunction against actions or proceedings in a state court? Can this power be bottomed on the
second clause of section 2283, namely, "or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction"? Since the interpleader under
rule 22(1) can usually be maintained only if the claimants
are served within the state where the federal action has been
brought, it should not run counter to the Anti-Injunction
Act to enjoin such claimants preliminarily. These questions,
however, as far as can be ascertained, have not yet been
passed on by the courts.2 12
(9) Discharge of Stakeholder Under Statltory
Interpleader:
Section 2361 of title 28 also provides that the court
"may discharge the plaintiff from further liability . .. .
It would seem, however, that such discharge should not be
granted in the first stage of interpleader,2 1 3 except in the
case of strict interpleader, i.e., where the stakeholder is completely disinterested. "Since this is a case of an action 'in
the nature of interpleader,' the plaintiffs should not be discharged nor do they seek to be discharged, but the case should
pend, whether determined here or elsewhere, until it appears
212See
Holcomb v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 228 F.2d 75 (10th Cir. 1955).
213
Turman Oil Co. v. Lathrop, 8 F. Supp. 870, 873 (N.D. Okla. 1934).
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what portion of the fund, if any, shall be awarded to the
plaintiffs, and what portions, if any, should be awarded to
one of the two adverse claimants." 214
(10) Discharge of Stakeholder Under Civil Rule 22(1):
Rule 22(1) does not expressly provide for the discharge
of the stakeholder. However, since it is grounded, as is
statutory interpleader, on the basic principles of equitable
interpleader, the conclusion reached above should be true
here, namely, that the stakeholder will not be discharged in
the first stage of interpleader unless he is completely disinterested. Rule 67, which provides generally for deposit in
court, could be availed of at times if the stakeholder were a
defendant. "Once the suits against it had been commenced,
Wells Fargo could have served notice upon the other parties,
disclaimed all interests in the moneys, and requested the
court's permission to deposit the money into the registry of
the court .... 1 215 It is to be noted, however, that this
rule does not by its terms discharge such a disinterested
stakeholder.
(11) Defensive Interpleader Under Statutory
Interpleader:
Although before the Interpleader Act of 1936, some
courts had allowed interpleader by way of equitable defense
to an action at law,2 16 this right was specifically spelled out
in the 1936 act as follows:
(e) In any action at law in a United States District Court against
any person, firm, corporation, association, or society, such defendant
may set up by way of equitable defense, in accordance with section
214

Moseley v. Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 157, 159 (W.D. Mo.
1952).
2

15 Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 209 F.2d 467,

473216(9th Cir. 1953).

Hintz v. Hintz, 78 F2d 432 (7th Cir. 1935) ; Pearson v. Holden, 58 F2d
1050 (D. Mass. 1932); Duell v. Greiner, 15 F.2d 726 (S.D. Fla. 1926).
Cf. Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 56 F.2d 385 (S.D.N.Y.
1932) ; Irving Trust Co. v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 47 F.2d 907 (S.D.N.Y.

1931).
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274b of the Judicial Code (U.S.C., title 28, sec. 398), any matter
which would entitle such person, firm, corporation, association, or
society to file an original or ancillary bill of interpleader or bill in
the nature of interpleader in the same court or in any other United
States District Court against the plaintiff in such action at law and
one or more other adverse claimants, under the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection or any other provision of the Judicial
Code and the rules of court made pursuant thereto. The defendant
may join as parties to such equitable defense any claimant or claimants who are not already parties to such action at law. The district
court in which such equitable defense is interposed shall thereby
possess the powers conferred upon district courts by paragravh;
(c) and (d) of this subsection and by section 274b of the Judicial
2 17
Code.
This subqection, however, is omitted from the 1948
codification "as unnecessary, such matters being governed
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 218 This means.
of course, that counterclaims and the bringing in of new
parties are covered by the federal rules. Since affirmative
relief is sought by the defendant, his claim is a counterclaim
or, in certain cases, a cross-claim under rule 13.219 Subdivision (h) of the same rule provides that the court shall order
parties to a counterclaim who are not parties to the original
action to be brought in as defendants.
The general principles applicable to plaintiff statutory
interpleader, a fortiori govern interpleader by the defendant.
But the court-adopted principle of ancillary or dependent
220
jurisdiction may be of assistance.
(12)

Defensive Interpleader Under Civiil Rete 22(1):

This rule specifically provides that "a defendant exposed
to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of
217 Act of Jan. 20, 1936, ch. 13, 49 Stat. 1096.
See Bynum v. Prudential
Life Ins. Co., 7 F.R.D. 585 (E.D.S.C. 1947).
218 Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 2361 (1958).
219 See Official Form 21, "Answer to Complaint . . . with Counterclaim for
Interpleader."
220 See Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (lst Cir. 1955) ; A/S Krediit
Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 155 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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cross-claim or counterclaim." 221 And obviously the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure apply.
The general principles applicable to interpleader by
plaintiff under rule 22(1) discussed above, govern interpleader by the defendant. Here also, as previously stated
regarding statutory interpleader, the court-developed principle of ancillary or dependent jurisdiction may support a
defensive interpleader.
(13) Interpleader Under Special Acts:

The Advisory Committee Note to rule 22 lists two special interpleader statutes which have been substantially
continued.
The first is former Title 38 U.S.C. Section 445,222 which
deals with actions on veterans' contracts of insurance with
the United States. This section provides, in part, as follows:
In all cases where the Veterans' Administration acknowledges the
indebtedness of the United States upon any such contract of insurance and there is a dispute as to the person or persons entitled to
payment, a suit in the nature of a bill of interpleader may be brought
by the Veterans' Administration in the name of the United States
against all persons having or claiming to have any interest in such
insurance in the . . . district court in and for the district in which
any such claimants reside: Provided, That no less than thirty days
prior to instituting such suit the Veterans' Administration shall mail
a notice of such intention to each of the persons to be made parties
to the suit.
Provision is made for service on parties not inhabitants of

or not found within the district of an order of the court,
personally or by publication.2 2 3 It has been held that under
221 See Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 209 F.2d 467
(9th Cir. 1953); Republic of China v. American Express Co., 195 F.2d 230
(2d Cir. 1952) ; A/S Krediit Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, supra note 220;
Republic of China v. Central Scientific Co., 120 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
22238 U.S.C. § 445 (1952).
Section 445 is omitted from the current codification of title 38. However, the Advisory Committee's Note to Fia. R.
CIrv. P. 4, states that this statutory provision is continued by FED. R. Civ. P.
4(e).
223 "Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court provides
for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons
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this act a defendant can counterclaim against the United
States for a sum greater than that admitted by it.
The so-called interpleader pleadings are informal and irregular.
Plainly, in a true interpleader proceeding, the mother could not
claim against the United States any greater sum than it admitted
owing to some one; and yet, by calling the proceeding an interpleader
when it was not, her right to make her full claim should not be cut
off. We think the situation calls for a disregard of all formalities
of pleading and for treating the case as one where the United States
is offering to pay the full amount, which it owes under this policy
to whatever person or persons may be entitled by law to recover
the sum from it ....

224

The other special interpleader statute is found in section
97 of title 49, permitting a carrier to interplead conflicting
claimants. This section provides: "If more than one person
claim the title or possession of goods, the carrier may require
all known claimants to interplead, either as a defense to an
action brought against him for nondelivery of the goods or
as an original suit, whichever is appropriate." 225 This section must be read -with section 98, which reads as follows:
If someone other than the consignee or the person in possession of
the bill has a claim to the title or possession of the goods, and the
carrier has information of such claim, the carrier shall be excused
from liability for refusing to deliver the goods, either to the consignee or person in possession of the bill or to the adverse claimant,
until the carrier has had a reasonable time to ascertain the validity
of the adverse claim or to bring legal proceedings to compel all
2 26
claimants to interplead.
These two sections, it has been held, do not authorize a steamship company which has intentionally given possession of
goods covered by order bills of lading to one not having the
upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, service shall be
made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute,
rule or order." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
224 Heinemann v. Heinemann, 50 F.2d 696, 697-98 (6th Cir. 1931).
See
also State Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 16 F.2d 439 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied mtb norm. Pons v. State Bank & Trust Co., 274 U.S. 737 (1926).
22539 STAT. 541, 49 U.S.C. § 97 (1958).
22639 STAT. 541, 49 U.S.C. §98 (1958).
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bills of lading, thereafter to compel the holders of the bills
to interplead and determine to which one of these holders
227
it should make delivery.
For matters of interpleader jurisdiction and procedure
in the federal courts under these two acts, statutory interpleader and rule 22 interpleader, discussed above, control
(depending, of course, upon the actual situation in a particular case).

The foregoing discussion has attempted to present the
past and present status of interpleader in federal jurisdiction
and to point up some of the problems still inherent in this
field. It is hoped that it may be of some assistance to those
interested in the study of this fascinating subject.

227

Mallory S.S. Co. v. Thalheim, 277 Fed. 196 (2d Cir. 1921).

